Parole in Perspective: How parole boards and hearings work

By Leah Wang    Tweet this
October 2025
Press release

Table of Contents
Parole board composition
Parole hearing format
Recommendations and example legislation
Conclusion
Appendix

Popular movie scenes depict a stone-faced parole board asking rote questions of an incarcerated person whose freedom hangs in the balance. While these scenes can resemble real experiences of parole hearings, they also obscure just how different parole is between states. As it stands, parole systems have largely kept prisons overcrowded while hopeful parole applicants1 navigate unnecessarily burdensome policies and practices. Our research into parole systems finds they are politically motivated, under-resourced, and largely dysfunctional as a mechanism for release.

The United States’ patchwork of discretionary parole2 systems vary in size, how they conduct hearings, and what experience board members bring to their work. But what many parole systems have in common is a lack of policies and practices that ensure a fairer process, such as a diversity of board member perspectives. No board requires, for example, that at least one member has some lived experience behind bars. Moreover, parole boards are often the sole authority in each state with the power to grant parole,3 but many parole boards are composed of just a few members who are expected to process hundreds of decisions weekly, sometimes spending mere minutes on life-altering decisions. For many parole applicants, hearings do not allow for an adequate and impartial in-person opportunity to present their case.

Map of United States showing states which have discretionary parole systems in 2025. The states excluded from our analysis have eliminated discretionary parole for most or all offenses for people sentenced after those laws took effect.

Despite these shortcomings, discretionary parole remains a vital tool for decarceration, and having parole systems we can improve is better than not having them at all.4 This belief led us to create this two-part series focused on the structure and function of discretionary parole systems. Anchored by a “North Star” document of Parole Principles, which we co-authored with the MacArthur Justice Center’s National Parole Transformation Project to establish a vision of what parole systems should look like, it is an essential resource for lawmakers, advocates, journalists, incarcerated people, and others interested in the particulars of discretionary parole across the U.S.

Our analysis covers 35 states that currently have discretionary parole, including Louisiana (which nearly fully abolished discretionary parole in August 20245) and California (which eliminated parole for most people in 1977, but still holds thousands of discretionary parole hearings each year for those eligible). For these 35 states, we combed through statutes, policies, pending legislation, and the latest available parole grant and hearing data, and compiled them into comprehensive tables, which are available throughout both parts of this report as well as in the appendices.

Longtime readers of our work may remember our groundbreaking 2019 report, Grading the parole release systems of all 50 states, which demonstrated that simply having a discretionary parole system is not enough to guarantee a fair pathway to release, because nearly all parole systems received failing grades when evaluated for their fairness and transparency. This series builds on that report’s work by surfacing finer details about discretionary parole boards, hearings, and decisionmaking frameworks. But instead of attempting to collapse such multidimensional systems into one-dimensional grades, this report provides a comprehensive overview of parole systems to serve as a launch point for advocacy campaigns and increased awareness for those seeking parole.

Parole board composition: Most parole boards are politically appointed and aren’t required to have diverse perspectives or experiential knowledge

To begin, we were interested in how state parole boards are created and composed, and what rules guide their formation. After scouring statutes and parole board policies, we found that while most parole boards have a few things in common — such as how they’re appointed, whether they face term limits, and whether they are paid a salary or a per diem; our analysis also found vast and important differences in parole board design between states.

Table 1. Select characteristics of parole boards in states with discretionary parole
See Appendix Table 1 for more information we collected about parole boards
State Name of parole board authority Statute(s) establishing the parole board Size (allowed by statute) Is the board fully appointed? (as of July 2025) Term length Term limit How are board members compensated?
Alabama Bureau of Pardons and Paroles S15-22-20 3 members Yes 6 years No Salary
Alaska Parole Board S33.16 5 Yes 5 years No Per diem
Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board S16-93-201 7 Yes 7 years No Salary; approx. $88k-110k
California Board of Parole Hearings S12838.4 Article 14 21 Yes 3 years No Salary
Colorado State Board of Parole S17-2-201 9 Yes 3 years No Salary; approx. $120k
Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles S54-124a 10 full time, up to 5 part time Yes “coterminous with the term of the Governor” Yes; same as appointing governor Salary (full-time members); per diem (part-time members)
Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles S42-9-2 5 Yes 7 years No Salary
Hawaii Hawaii Paroling Authority S353-61 5 Yes 4 years No Salary (chairperson); wage (other members)
Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole S20-1002 7 Yes 3 years No Per diem
Iowa Board of Parole S904A.1, S904A.2 5 Yes 4 years No Salary
Kentucky Parole Board S439.320 7 full-time, 2 part-time Yes 4 years No Salary (full-time members); per diem (part-time members)
Louisiana Committee on Parole S15:574.2 7 Yes 4 years (same as appointing governor Same term as appointing governor (2 term limit, 4 year terms) Salary; $50k for chairperson, $47k for vice chairperson
Maryland Parole Commission Title 7, Subtitle 2, S7-202 10 No (7 of 10) 6 years No Salary: approx. $117k
Massachusetts Parole Board Title II ch. 27 S4 7 No (6 of 7) 5 years No Salary; upwards of $190k
Michigan Parole Board S791.231a 10 No (9 of 10) 2-4 years No Salary
Mississippi State Parole Board S47-7-5 5 Unclear At the determination of the governor No Salary and “compensation or per diem”
Missouri Parole Board S217.665 7 Yes 6 years No Salary
Montana Board of Pardons and Parole S2-15-2305 6 Yes 6 years No Salary
Nebraska Board of Parole Chapter 83, S189, S190 5 Yes 6 years No Salary; $94k for chairperson, $86k for other members
Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners S213.108 7 Yes 4 years No Salary
New Hampshire Adult Parole Board Title LXII, Chapter 651-A:3 5 Yes 5 years Yes; no more than 2 terms Salary; $30k for non-chairperson members
New Jersey State Parole Board S30:4-123.47 15 with 3 alternates No (13 of 15) 6 years Unclear Salary
New York State Board of Parole Exc ch. 18, Article 12-B, S259-B Not more than 19 No (17 of 19) 6 years Unclear Salary of $190k and use of a vehicle
North Dakota Parole Board S12-59-01 6 Yes 3 years Unclear Salary
Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board S57.332.1 5 Yes 4 years (same as appointing governor) Same term as appointing governor (2 term limit, 4 year terms) Salary: $85k
Pennsylvania Parole Board Title 61, Part IV, Subchapter B, S6111 9 Yes 6 years Unclear Salary; approx. $84k-$128k
Rhode Island Parole Board S13-8-1 7 Yes 3 years No Salary
South Carolina Board of Paroles and Pardons S24-21-10 7 No (6 of 7) 6 years No Per diem
South Dakota Board of Pardons and Paroles S24-13 9 Yes 4 years No “Compensation” likely salary
Tennessee Board of Parole S40-28-103 7 Yes 6 years No Salary
Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles Goverment Code 508 subchapter B 7 Yes 6 years No Salary
Utah Board of Pardons and Parole S77-27-2 5 full time members and 5 pro tempore members No (4 of 5) 5 years No Salary
Vermont Parole Board Title 28, ch. 7, S451 5 with 2 alternates Yes 3 years No Salary (chairperson); per diem (other members)
West Virginia Parole Board S62-12-12 9 Yes 6 years No Salary; $55k for chairperson, $50k for other members
Wyoming State Board of Parole S7-13-401 7 Yes 6 years No Salary “and travel expenses and per diem”

Most parole board members are appointed by the state’s governor, but not all go through a secondary confirmation process

In 34 of the 35 states we examined, the governor is involved in parole board appointments, and in 26 of those states, another authority — typically, the state senate — confirms those appointments. Board members are therefore political appointees, and governors can (and arguably do) utilize this power to embed their values into the criminal legal system, whether those are pro-carceral or decarceral values. For example, when New York Governor Kathy Hochul took office, she faced intense scrutiny over filling chronic parole board vacancies and appointing people who favored decarceration and parole based on rehabilitation.

There is one notable exception to this gubernatorial procedure: In Michigan, the director of the Department of Corrections singlehandedly appoints the parole board.6 Given that up to six of the 10 Michigan parole board members can be former corrections staff — and there are no other experiential requirements — this appointment process allows the corrections director to stack the board with allies.

The number of members allowed on each board varies widely

According to statutes we reviewed, parole boards are authorized to have anywhere from three members (in Alabama) to 21 (in California), though most boards have fewer than 10 members. We found that most boards were fully appointed when we conducted this research in July 2025, but seven states7 had at least one vacancy. Understaffing, particularly on smaller parole boards, can lead to backlogs and rushed decisions. As the Council of State Governments Justice Center shows in their essential report Overlooked: How Parole Boards Shape Lives and Systems, all states with discretionary parole have a sizable share of the prison population that is behind bars past their parole eligibility date. Accordingly, parole board members’ time is in high demand.

It’s important to note that it’s rare for a full parole board to conduct hearings or make decisions together; instead, some boards specify the number of members who serve on a single hearing panel, or the number of votes required for an official decision. We explain this further in the next section and include the relevant data we found in Appendix Table 1.

Parole board members generally serve terms ranging from two to seven years

Parole board statutes include term lengths of between two and seven years, but for the most part, do not specify term limits. Three states — Connecticut, Louisiana, and Oklahoma — have parole board term lengths and limits parallel to those of the governor, while New Hampshire has a two-term limit for its board members. In the remaining 31 states, those serving on parole boards can do so indefinitely.

Members whose terms have expired, however, aren’t immediately out of a job: “Zombie commissioners,” as they have been coined in New York, continue their work until the governor reappoints them or nominates new members. This lackadaisical process underscores how politicized parole boards can be; the governor can take no action, yet still tacitly support the board’s decisions or workflow.

In most states, nearly anyone can serve on a parole board, but some states favor law enforcement experience and none require system-impacted members

A handful of states have zero, minimal, or only vague requirements for members of their parole boards. Idaho and Wyoming only cap the number of members from the same political party; California’s nominees, overall, must reflect a broad “cross-section” of the state’s population; and Georgia’s parole board statutes outline no requirements whatsoever. The remaining states have parole board member requirements on the books, though it’s unclear the extent to which those requirements are actually enforced:

  • Half of discretionary parole states (17) mention a background in law enforcement as a qualifying credential, and seven parole boards8 specifically require one or more members to have current or former law enforcement experience. Other states mention experience with “criminal justice,” which could include academic experience but may also refer to law enforcement. When someone released on parole commits a serious, high-profile crime, there are calls to increase or guarantee law enforcement experience on boards to implement a more cautious paroling agenda. Law enforcement officers, trained to see people with suspicion, might favor incarceration over release in most circumstances.
  • Taking a different approach to the same credential, Texas and Michigan laws cap the number of former state corrections employees who can serve on the parole board at the same time (at three and four, respectively), acknowledging the reality that retired corrections staff may present an irresistible option for governors — or in the case of Michigan, the director of corrections — to appoint to their parole boards. Other parole board members in these states could still be former law enforcement officers, leading to a disproportionate number of pro-punishment voices.
  • While some state statutes do require professions such as sociology, psychology, or social work to be represented on a parole board, we found that many requirement clauses unfortunately conflate these credentials with law enforcement experience. For example, each member on Arkansas’ parole board must have five or more years of professional experience in “parole or post-release supervision, probation, corrections, criminal justice, law, law enforcement, psychology, psychiatry, sociology, social work, or other related field.” This overly broad statute may lead to an imbalance of professional perspectives on parole boards. Experiential requirements should be explicit in calling for qualified community-based practitioners from psychology, trauma-informed care, and substance use or mental health care.
  • No parole board, by statute or policy, requires one or more of its members to be formerly incarcerated or have lived experience within the criminal legal system. Parole boards do not set aside seats for people who have experienced other root causes of system involvement, either, such as substance use disorder. To be sure, no statutes explicitly prohibit these experiences, but without requiring them, parole boards may never truly reflect traditionally policed and incarcerated populations that can understand an applicants’ life behind bars, and the stark realities of reentry and supervision. Beyond representation, people with experiential knowledge can provide more accurate and practical insight into an applicant’s ability to navigate obstacles to successful reentry.

Parole hearings: Most parole applicants can expect a face-to-face hearing, but many hearings are virtual, and representation and support are limited

Even though parole boards come in many shapes and sizes, they all carry out the same important function: administering hearings for applicants who hope to be released from prison. Each parole system we examined takes a different approach to hearings when it comes to, for example, who is allowed to attend or an applicant’s crime of conviction:

Table 2. Select characteristics of parole hearings in states with discretionary parole
See Appendix Table 1 for more information we collected about parole hearings
State Is legal representation allowed at hearings? Are hearings public? How many members make a hearing panel?
Alabama No Yes 2 (a quorum)
Alaska Yes No
Arkansas Yes No 1 member can conduct a hearing, but 5 affirmative votes are required
California Yes No; neutral observers or credentialed media can attend upon request only
Colorado Yes Yes 1 member can conduct an application interview, but two members must concur
Connecticut No Yes 3
Georgia No No
Hawaii Yes No
Idaho Yes Yes
Iowa No Yes (audio only)
Kentucky Unclear; statute and policies are silent on representation Yes 5 make a quorum
Louisiana Yes Yes
Maryland No No; at victim request only 2 for those serving a life sentence of convicted for any form of homicide; otherwise, 1 hearing officer
Massachusetts Yes, in hearings for parole applicants with life sentences Yes, in hearings for parole applicants with life sentences 3 for those serving non-life sentences; full board for life sentence hearings
Michigan Yes Yes, for parole applicants with certain life sentences 3 for those serving non-life sentences; full board for life sentences
Mississippi Yes Unclear
Missouri Yes No 1 board member and 2 hearing officers
Montana Yes Yes 3
Nebraska Yes Yes quorum, undefined
Nevada Yes Yes One board member (“Commissioner”) and one hearing representative, or two or more members; 3 members for more serious crimes or if their sentence was commuted by the state Pardons Board; Four members must concur for a deliberation to be official
New Hampshire Yes Yes 3
New Jersey Yes Yes 2; full board for some decisions
New York No Unclear 2 or 3
North Dakota Unclear; statute and policies are silent on representation Unclear 3
Oklahoma Yes Yes 3 votes (majority) are required for a favorable recommendation
Pennsylvania Unclear; attorney can file the parole application, but policy is silent on hearing Unclear
Rhode Island Yes Unclear Majority vote required for grant of parole; unanimous vote required for life sentences
South Carolina Yes, but no attorney provided for indigent parole applicants Yes 3 (for nonviolent crimes) or full board
South Dakota Yes Yes 2 members; 2 members must concur for a grant or denial, or majority for a full board hearing
Tennessee Yes Yes 3 members must agree for a parole grant, 4 for some serious crimes
Texas Yes No 3
Utah Yes Yes (in-person or audio streaming, depending on facility) Majority vote required for granting parole
Vermont no Yes (virtual) 3
West Virginia Unclear; statute and policies are silent on representation No 3
Wyoming Yes No; attendees (in support) capped at 5 including attorney Three (3) or more members; in exigent circumstances, hearings may be conducted by one (1) or more members of the Board

Many parole boards hold hearings and votes with a subset of members, while full-board hearings are reserved for specific cases

In order to carry out hundreds of hearings and decisions each month, parole boards split up their workload among smaller panels rather than via the entire board. But we found wide variation in how states approach the structure of hearing panels and voting on final decisions. For example, Alabama, Maryland, South Dakota, New Jersey, and (sometimes) New York conduct hearings with just two board members. In Arkansas, Colorado, Missouri, and Nevada, only one board member is required to conduct a hearing.9 When it comes to voting, not all board members need to weigh in; in Colorado, just two members (out of nine) need to concur for a decision to be official.

Small hearing panels or vote thresholds may sound like an advantage for a parole applicant, with fewer people to convince of their readiness for release. But a small hearing panel also leaves less room for dialogue, and ultimately presents a lower threshold for denying parole, too. If a parole applicant’s hearing — their opportunity to explain their growth and preparation — has any bearing on the outcome, then it’s worth considering if a hearing panel of one, two, or three is truly fair.

Eight parole boards10 require a larger panel and/or a higher voting threshold for parole applicants with life sentences or serious crimes of conviction, perpetuating common misconceptions of people convicted of “violent crimes.” Rhode Island, for example, requires a majority of its seven-member board to grant parole to applicants serving a non-life sentence, but a unanimous vote for life-sentenced applicants. Evidently, parole boards attach the highest stakes to those with life sentences or “violent” crime convictions, even though people with these convictions typically pose the least risk.11

Most states allow parole applicants to face the parole board for their hearing, but some states always or typically hold virtual parole hearings

In our 2019 report, we graded states on whether parole boards offered “face-to-face” hearings, arguing that applicants deserve to sit before the people who will grant or deny their freedom. This time around, because many agencies turned to virtual hearings during the COVID-19 pandemic, we made note of when parole hearings were always in-person, always virtual, or if the format depends on the circumstances. Most parole systems (28 of 35) allow some sort of face-to-face opportunity, but 11 of those states are holding virtual parole hearings most or all of the time (see Table 2 above, or the second map in the slideshow below). Meanwhile, parole boards in Alabama, Georgia, and Texas do not hold hearings that a parole applicant can attend; rather, the board reviews materials and deliberates entirely on their own. (Oddly, Alabama’s hearings are still open to the public, where people can speak in support of or against parole.)

While better than nothing, a virtual hearing is objectively different from an in-person hearing: The virtual format is less desirable for conveying emotions, establishing eye contact, building trust through non-verbal communication, and for the visual acuity that is important for human communication. For states offering in-person or virtual hearings, it’s unclear how often each format is used or what circumstances lead to one being selected over another. However, some states acknowledge that in-person hearings are extremely useful for some groups of people, such as those with disabilities.12 With parole boards at their current sizes and workloads, it is understandable that many turned to virtual hearings permanently, but this choice may reduce costs at the expense of fairness.13

  • map of United States showing which states with discretionary parole systems allow parole applicants to have an attorney attend their parole hearing
  • map of United States showing which states with discretionary parole systems hold hearings in-person, virtually, if the format depends on circumstances, or if the parole applicant does not have a face-to-face opportunity with the board

Over half of states’ discretionary parole hearings are open to the public, but transparency may be a mixed blessing

One advantage to holding virtual hearings is that loved ones and members of the public can attend without traveling — if allowed by policy. Regardless of format, public hearings create an opportunity to hold boards accountable for their words and actions; at the same time, this transparency gives the media an opportunity to draw attention to the hearing and capitalize on fears of releasing people from prisons, steering unfair negative sentiment toward a parole applicant’s (and their supporters’) long-awaited shot at freedom.

Applicants whose criminal cases were already notorious face “politicized parole consideration,” leading parole board members into a pressure chamber that may not lead to fair decisionmaking. On the other hand, pre-hearing media attention can potentially steer public sentiment in favor of parole, as in the immensely popular Menendez brothers documentary. Public or not, parole hearings often give significant room for victim and prosecutor input, which we explored in our 2019 report, and which we mention in the second part of this report. Ultimately, to ensure fairness, parole hearings should allow public access, whether in-person or virtually, particularly for those who plan to speak about the parole applicant’s case.14 For those who cannot attend, hearing transcripts should be available upon request — but not for a fee, as happens in at least two states (Tennessee and West Virginia).15

About two-thirds (24) of states allow parole applicants to have an attorney or other representative with them at a hearing

Parole attorneys can play a crucial role in helping applicants prepare for their hearings before the fact. But attorneys can also provide meaningful support during hearings, too: they can speak on an applicants’ behalf, providing clear and thorough explanations of someone’s accomplishments or reentry plans, and can provide additional support by being there during a daunting, high-stakes interview. In South Carolina, those who can afford an attorney have the right to be represented at their parole hearing, but those who cannot afford it do not have the right to have an attorney appointed. It’s unclear how other states approach indigent parole applicants, but nonprofits in New York and Massachusetts deploy volunteers to assist in preparation in place of an attorney.

Recommendations: Parole boards can stem the tide on mass incarceration, but they’re not built for efficiency or equity

Across the country, parole boards meet to decide whether parole-eligible incarcerated people — a large slice of the mass incarceration “pie”16 — return to their communities or remain behind bars. But as our deep dive into discretionary parole boards shows, board members’ work is unsustainable, bogged down by politics, and largely unable to meet the needs and rights of parole-eligible people to a fair, timely, and thorough evaluation of their case for release. Our recommendations are based on some of the central tenets of our Parole Principles, asserting that parole boards should be larger, more diverse, and that hearings should be transparent in order to achieve greater efficiency and fairness.

Implement new experiential requirements for parole board members

Some lawmakers and advocates are noticing that parole boards represent an opportunity to transform parole systems into meaningful tools for release. Boards are frequently unrepresentative of their state populations and parole applicants, which can reduce fairness and empathy in the parole hearing process. They are expected to determine an applicants’ mental and emotional readiness to reenter society despite many members being largely unqualified to do so, including appropriately considering relevant background information such as childhood trauma, mental health history, and substance use support needs. And while statutes limiting the number of law enforcement professionals are helpful, reforms should also proactively staff boards with people who have lived experience and/or clinical expertise in these areas.17

We found some examples of states reconsidering the relevance and depth of parole board members’ professional and other experiences, but more work needs to be done:

  • Alaska has pending legislation that would modify its board staffing requirements (currently, they vaguely call for at least one member to have “experience in the field of criminal justice”). If passed, it would require one member to be in a federally recognized tribe, and one member to have experience providing drug or alcohol addiction recovery support or personal experience with drug or alcohol addiction. The bill would also limit the number of former correctional staff who can serve on the board concurrently to three.
  • New York passed legislation in 2024 modified its requirement that all parole board members have a four-year college degree, acknowledging that individuals with a wide range of experiences can be qualified to serve on the board. Without a degree and five years’ experience, however, board members must bring ten or more years of experience in criminology, administration of criminal justice, law enforcement, sociology, law, social work, corrections, psychology, psychiatry, or medicine.
  • Rhode Island lawmakers have introduced legislation that requires one parole board member to “be a person directly impacted by the criminal legal system — specifically, someone who has completed probation or parole at least three years before their appointment.” However, this person must also bring professional experience in psychology, mental health, substance use, transitional housing, reentry, education, or law.
  • Massachusetts has pending legislation that calls for four members to have at least five years of experience in fields of psychiatry, psychology, social work, or the treatment of substance use disorder (a relatively short and specific list, compared to some statutes); one of those four members must be a licensed mental health professional; and one member of the board to be a formerly incarcerated individual with lived experience on parole.

Parole board expansion can add desperately needed capacity to a backlogged system

The Council of State Governments estimates that over 200,000 incarcerated people have a parole eligibility date in the past. There are simply not enough parole board members to conduct hearings and make decisions in both a fair and a timely way. Indeed, some advocates argue that parole board members have “an impossible job”: They have to read through lengthy applications, travel to prisons, and simultaneously conduct other business, such as parole revocation or pardon hearings. And as some states (fortunately) continue to pass reforms that expand parole eligibility and access, a growing pool of applicants may face an unfairly long wait for their hearings as parole boards scramble to fulfill their duties.18

Some state lawmakers have already figured out that expanding their parole board would bring them in line with the modern demands of parole:

  • Montana recently passed legislation expanding its five-member parole board to six members.
  • Alabama has pending legislation that would increase its three-member parole board to allow five members.
  • Alaska has pending legislation (the same bill modifying its board member requirements) that would increase its five-member parole board to seven members.
  • Maryland lawmakers have seen progress on legislation that would expand its 10-member parole board by up to 10 additional members.
  • Massachusetts lawmakers have filed legislation that would expand its parole board from seven to nine members.

Greater hearing transparency can help ensure fairness

As our 35-state analysis shows, parole hearings range in format from closed-door executive sessions to livestreamed events, and have a range of other policies that can confuse parole applicants or prevent them from adequately preparing to go before the board. Of course, parole boards should be able to conduct hearings in a way that is safe (such as during a pandemic) or efficient (when traveling across a state is prohibitive). While virtual hearings have some notable disadvantages compared to in-person interviews,19 it’s important for a parole system to have a flexible policy instead of postponing hearings or failing to provide the appropriate setup for someone to understand their own hearing.

Additionally, we recommend that:

  • Parole applicants with a disability or condition that makes communication hard should be afforded an in-person hearing with the appropriate accommodations.
  • Virtual or not, hearings should be open to parole applicants (in Alabama, no one attends their own parole hearing), and their support networks should also be able to attend and speak on the applicant’s behalf. Parole boards that emphasize the completion of a “reentry plan” or a “home plan” should, after all, be able to see and hear from those who will be a major part of the reintegration process.
  • Although most states allow legal representation at parole hearings, not everyone has equitable access to such representation; all parole applicants should have access to free and competent counsel in advance of their hearing.20 The Parole Principles explain this in further detail.
  • Parole hearings should be recorded and made available to the parole applicant, at least upon request, for later reference.21

Conclusion

As our deep-dive into discretionary parole systems reveals, there’s no neat summary of how parole boards or parole hearings work. But no state is “doing” parole well, and we believe that the enormous potential of parole boards as a tool for decarceration is limited by their design. Discretionary parole should be structured in a way that allows each parole applicant the fair and timely review afforded to them by their original sentence and state law, before a panel of experienced professionals empathetic to rehabilitation, transformation, and preparation for reentering society.

Just like parole boards, political realities vary widely between states, making different reforms possible or out of reach. Nevertheless, this deep-dive into state parole boards and hearings — together with the second part of this report (covering parole grants and decisionmaking) and our essential parole principles — form a comprehensive and useful guide for advocates across the country looking to close the gap between the promise of discretionary parole and the reality.


Appendix

Appendix 1: Characteristics of discretionary parole boards and parole hearings, 2025

Footnotes

  1. Throughout this report, we’ll refer to incarcerated people who are considered for parole release as “parole applicants” or simply “applicants.”  ↩

  2. Discretionary parole exists in states which have retained their paroling authority within an “indeterminate” system of sentencing, in which someone’s release date from prison cannot be reasonably predicted at the conclusion of their trial because it’s decided later on by a discretionary authority. In the remaining 17 states, most incarcerated people are serving a “determinate” sentence, in which their release date is determined by the judge at sentencing (and recalculated in a predictable way due to earned good time or other programs), not by a parole board.  ↩

  3. A governor is sometimes named as another actor with paroling power, such as in California.  ↩

  4. Historically, deep skepticism toward paroling authorities (for being too lenient) led over a dozen states to abolish or severely curtail parole.  ↩

  5. Louisiana was the 17th state to abolish parole and the first state to do so since 2000. As we explained, Louisiana’s parole system was bad — earning an “F” in our 2019 report — but it was better than nothing. We included Louisiana in our analysis because many people still incarcerated there remain parole-eligible under the old law.  ↩

  6. This has only been the case since 2011, when then-Governor Rick Snyder reduced the size of the parole board from 15 to 10 members, and shifted appointment responsibility away from the governor to the director of corrections, reportedly to “remove an unneeded layer of bureaucracy and save taxpayers money.”  ↩

  7. Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, and Utah.  ↩

  8. Alabama, Colorado, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.  ↩

  9. In Missouri, parole hearing panels consist of one board member and “two (2) hearing officers appointed by the board.” In Nevada, parole hearing panels may consist of just one board member (“Commissioner”) and one “Hearing Representative.” It’s unclear how exactly hearing officers or representatives are chosen; Nevada statute simply says Hearing Representatives, who “make recommendations to the Board,” are “named by the Board and placed on a list, from which, the Chairman may designate [them] to serve…”  ↩

  10. Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Tennessee; South Dakota statute mentions full board hearings but does not specify when they are required.  ↩

  11. Research shows that people in prisons for “violent” crimes of conviction have the lowest recidivism rates, tend to age out of dangerous behavior, and likely have some sort of victimization history themselves, signaling a need for treatment, not incarceration. The unfounded panic over releasing people in this category, let alone including them in decarceral reforms, is also baked into parole guidelines and risk assessments, as we explain in the second part of this report.  ↩

  12. In California, a statute enacted in 2020 says that certain people, such as those with developmental disabilities or who primarily use sign language, are automatically scheduled for an in-person parole hearing, even though the California parole board handles most hearings virtually. A clause in Arkansas’ parole policy manual states that a parole applicant will receive accommodations or be seen in person if it is “apparent that participating in a hearing conducted via video will create an undue hardship due to a documented disability.”  ↩

  13. As we note in the 2019 report, some parole systems have a process where they send a non-board member staff person to interview the parole applicant, create a summary and/or recommendation about parole release, and send it to board members. This “preparole interview” is another practice that presents tradeoffs for the parole applicant’s potential success. It could help them prepare by offering real experience answering questions similar to what the board might ask, or even correct some inaccurate information. But the interviewer’s summary may bias parole board members before the applicant even enters their hearing.  ↩

  14. In Maryland, hearings that normally happen behind closed doors can be made public by request of a victim.  ↩

  15. According to a Campaign Zero analysis of Maryland parole statutes and relevant regulations, hearing recordings there are destroyed within 30 days if the applicant does not file an appeal in that time. While we did not look into whether other states do this or have policies that allow it, it’s important to note that recordings or transcripts are essential to parole applicants in their preparation, and to board members and the public for basic accountability.  ↩

  16. We don’t know exactly how many parole-eligible people there are nationwide, but according to the Council of State Governments Justice Center, state prison populations consist of anywhere from 7% to 98% parole-eligible people.  ↩

  17. Some states have overall statutory language encouraging diversity and representativeness on public boards and commissions, but it’s difficult to ascertain how these orders are followed, given a dearth of data on appointees. Further, a recent wave of anti-diversity, equity, and inclusion laws have likely quashed or reversed many of these efforts.  ↩

  18. For example, parole reform in California lowered the qualifying age and time served requirement for elderly parole eligibility, and raised the qualifying age for those who were young adults at the time of their crime of conviction. According to Human Rights Watch, about 5,000 incarcerated people in California became newly eligible for parole under SB260, the 2013 bill that broadened access to parole for young adults. And when California’s elderly parole eligibility was changed in 2021, it’s unclear exactly how many people were immediately due for a hearing, but the Board of Parole scheduled an unprecedented number of elderly parole hearings in 2022, 76% more than the year prior.

    In Massachusetts, a state Supreme Court ruling resulted in approximately 200 more people in state prisons serving parole-eligible life sentences, requiring a full-board hearing; unsurprisingly, these applicants then faced delays in getting hearings.  ↩

  19. Research on remote hearings within the criminal legal system suggests that they can make proceedings hard to understand for some participants, lead to more punitive outcomes, and feel altogether less personal, leading to dehumanization and a lack of empathy.  ↩

  20. A group of incarcerated men in Massachusetts sued the state’s parole board in 2023, claiming that the board discriminated against them due to their mental disabilities by failing to assign them counsel in order to help them understand the complex parole proceedings. The lawsuit also alleges that the board penalized these applicants based on their appearance and conduct related to their mental disabilities.  ↩

  21. Although Ohio is not part of our analysis (it severely curtailed discretionary parole in 1996), a bipartisan bill there requires the parole board to electronically record all hearings and make them available to the public upon request.  ↩



Stay Informed


Get the latest updates:



Share on 𝕏 Donate


Events

Not near you?
Invite us to your city, college or organization.