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No wonder prisons and jails face constant understaffing and that communities increasingly resist new facilities: Decades of research show that the physical and mental health problems associated with correctional officers' jobs are inherent to the work, and that new prisons and jails fail to deliver on promises of economic development.

by Prison Policy Initiative, May 9, 2022

As we well know, people incarcerated in jails and prisons experience constant trauma, and are surrounded by brutality and violence that are impossible to escape. This experience has only grown worse in recent months. As we are frequently reminded in media coverage, prison and jail security staff (known as correctional officers or “COs”) have been quitting their jobs and failing to show up for work. This turnover and absenteeism leaves incarcerated people locked down in cells, experiencing minimal freedom of movement and social interaction, lost recreation time, difficulties accessing physical and mental health care, worse and less reliable food and mail services, and fewer programming and education opportunities.

But why are departments of corrections throughout the country complaining that they are unable to hire and retain enough staff?

The simplest and most obvious answer is there are way too many people locked up. States could dramatically reduce the need for additional staff by arresting and booking fewer people and releasing more. In European countries (which incarcerate far fewer people), the ratios of incarcerated people to staff are significantly lower than in the United States. As noted in a 2013 press release from the union representing federal workers, the number of federal correctional workers increased 19% from 2000 to 2013, while the federal prison population grew 41%.

But there is another reason prison and jail jobs sit vacant — a problem exacerbated by the pandemic but long predating it. Any way you look at it, working in a prison or jail is traumatic and harmful to mental health. As a result, people have always quit these jobs at high rates. Nearly 40 years ago, in 1983, a paper warned that “officer stress and burn-out has led to soaring organizational costs due to high rates of absenteeism and turnover.” In 2000, the average national turnover rate among COs was 16% (meaning the number of people quitting was 16% of the average CO headcount that year), a rate one author called “alarmingly high.” And a 2010 report found that the average CO turnover rate was 17% in 2006 and 2007, and 16% in 2008.

Today, as prisons and jails have become vectors of COVID-19, turnover rates have grown higher than ever.1 But as this briefing shows, long before COVID, corrections work meant being surrounded by trauma and suffering, while working stressful jobs that are both monotonous and require constant vigilance.

Of course, much of the violence behind bars is perpetrated by COs themselves; we know that staff often assault and abuse incarcerated people; encourage, bribe and threaten incarcerated people to abuse others; and watch without intervening when violence breaks out. In fact, Micol Seigel proposes in her book that prison workers — along with police, members of the military, and others employed in security or detention — can collectively be considered “violence workers,” as their roles are designed to exercise the state’s power to use violence for enforcement. Violence in correctional facilities is further exacerbated by stressful, miserable living conditions. But while this violence harms incarcerated people the most, it has life-altering consequences for workers as well. As a result, COs face negative mental and physical health outcomes, including extremely high rates of depression and PTSD. Worst of all, for many COs, the job fundamentally changes the way they relate to others, requiring them to dehumanize the people they supervise and cultivate a brutal authority that is hard to shake even at home.

This creates a vicious cycle. Correctional jobs are stressful and traumatic, leading to high rates of burnout, absenteeism, and staff turnover. But when people quit or don’t show up for work, this makes the job even worse for their colleagues, who are often left working overtime shifts2 alongside new, inexperienced coworkers.3

While the trauma and stress faced by incarcerated people dwarfs the experiences of correctional officers, it is important to study the frequently overlooked ways that prisons and jails harm everyone associated with them.

This is particularly crucial because, for years, state and local governments have used the promise of these “good state jobs” to garner support for newer, bigger prisons. For decades, rural towns looked to prisons as a saving grace that would bring economic development, boost local populations, and most of all, replace disappearing jobs. As that prison-building boom cools, now we are seeing pressure to build new, expanded county and city jails. But when officials promote prisons and jails as job creators, it is important to keep in mind what these jobs actually look like, and the effects they have on workers and the community.

To be clear, the problems outlined throughout this article are fundamental to the nature and environment of working in a prison or jail. These problems cannot be solved by increasing budgets, doubling down on hiring efforts, providing additional training, or increasing pay and benefits.

 

Exposure to trauma is inescapable on the job

Although incidents of violence behind bars are poorly tracked and reported, every count we do have shows that those who spend time in prisons and jails (staff and incarcerated people alike) are surrounded by traumatizing violence:

Estimating the prevalence of violence in prisons and jails
Reported incidents and estimates
Indicator of violence State prisons Federal prisons County jails Source
Deaths by suicide in correctional facility 311 deaths in 2019 29 deaths in 2019 355 deaths in 2019 Mortality in State and Federal Prisons, 2001-2019; Mortality in Local Jails, 2000-2019
Deaths by homicide in correctional facility 143 deaths in 2019 11 deaths in 2019 25 deaths in 2019
“Intentionally injured” by staff or other incarcerated person since admission to prison 14.8% of incarcerated people in 2004 8.3% of incarcerated people in 2004 Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities, 2004
“Staff-on-inmate assaults” 21% of incarcerated men were assaulted by staff over 6 months in 2005 Wolff & Shi, 2010
“Prisoner-on-prisoner assaults” 46,442 assaults from July 1, 2018 to June 30, 2019 Census of State and Federal Adult Correctional Facilities, 2019
Incidents of sexual victimization of incarcerated people (perpetrated by either staff or incarcerated people) State-operated prisons: 16,448 reported incidents in 2018 BOP-operated prisons: 922 reported incidents in 2018 8,651 reported incidents in 2018 Survey of Sexual Victimization in Adult Correctional Facilities, 2012-2018
Private prisons: 1,514 reported incidents in 2018
Other adult facilities (i.e., military prisons, ICE facilities, and jails on tribal lands that hold only adults): 219 reported incidents in 2018

A 2021 paper analyzing the experiences of 156 correctional supervisors in a northeastern U.S. state revealed that large percentages witnessed or experienced the following traumatic events in a typical month:

  • 55% – a suicide attempt by an incarcerated person
  • 93% – violence inflicted by one incarcerated person on another

And in a typical year, many reported witnessing or experiencing:

  • 61% – suicide of an incarcerated person
  • 65% – non-suicide death of an incarcerated person
  • 45% – a coworker suicide

Chart showing percentage of staff in a northeastern state that report witnessing violence, suicides, and other deaths in a typical month or year

Similarly, a team of researchers have published a series of papers based on surveys of Canadian workers in high-stress occupations. They found that institutional corrections workers report high rates of exposure to various traumatic events. For example:

  • 45% had witnessed a death in line of duty
  • 78% experienced or witnessed serious injuries in the line of duty
  • 69% experienced or witnessed incidents that seriously threatened their life or the life of a colleague
  • 65% witnessed or learned about the suicide of a close colleague or superior

A correctional officer from Oregon described this on-the-job trauma in a 2015 article in the Guardian: “You’re doing tier count and you’re watching a human being die in front of your eyes because he’s coughing up lungs and screaming with his eyes for help and there’s nothing you can do.” The man’s son, also a CO, recalled that on his first day of work, he witnessed the mutilated body of a man who had been beaten to death.

 

Correctional officers have high rates of depression, PTSD, and suicide

It is not surprising that many COs struggle with the mental and emotional toll of regular exposure to trauma. A 2021 analysis of thousands of anonymous surveys filled out by COs in California prisons revealed that, among those who answered specific questions about the prior month:

  • 48% had felt anxious, nervous, or on edge
  • 80% felt tired or fatigued, even right after sleeping
  • 28% consumed six or more drinks on at least one occasion
  • 28% felt down, depressed, or hopeless
  • 4% experienced repeated, disturbing memories
  • 11% had suicidal thoughts or had attempted suicide

Chart showing percentage of California correctional officers that report feeling depressed or anxious, or experiencing disturbing memories or having suicidal thoughts in the month prior

A 2018 survey of corrections employees in Washington State estimated a PTSD rate of 19%, which is similar to rates among veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and higher than that of police officers.

Several studies put the rate of PTSD even higher. A 2013 study of nearly 3,600 corrections professionals from all over the country estimated that 34% of correctional staff in security roles have PTSD and 31% have depression. A 2016 paper studying correctional officers in Michigan estimated that 34% of participants had PTSD, 36% had depression, and 25% had both. Rates of both — as well as the risk of suicide — were higher among people working in high-security units, and among those who had worked in corrections for 10 years or more, indicating that these problems do not get easier with time or experience. And a 2017 Canadian study (again, using the pool of high-stress workers mentioned above) found that more than 54% of correctional workers screened positive for mental disorders including PTSD (29%) and major depressive disorder (31%), compared to a baseline diagnosis rate of 10% of the Canadian population.

Although there are not many studies on correctional officer suicides, one analysis found that COs in New Jersey had more than double the suicide rate of 25-to-64 year old men in the state from 2003 to 2007. A 2016 article tracking CO suicides in Massachusetts found the suicide rate to be about six times that of the general state population. An earlier study from 1997 found that COs have a 39% higher rate of suicide than the rest of the working age population. And the survey of Canadian correctional workers revealed that 35% had experienced suicidal ideation in their lifetimes (including 11% in the prior year), and 8% had previously attempted suicide.

This relentless stress inevitably leads to burnout, which is often associated with workers in healthcare, human services, and education, and is characterized by emotional exhaustion, depersonalization, and a sense of a lack of personal accomplishments. Burnout can lead to depression, and can cause someone to withdraw emotionally, psychologically, and socially from their job. A 2020 Swiss study found that — although violence is infrequent in Swiss prisons — COs who did witness or directly experience violence had more exhaustion and a decreased sense of security, which in turn, led to higher levels of burnout. The paper concluded that “not only serious major incidents, but also the daily grind have an effect.”

A 2013 literature review, which provides a collection of research on the topic, concluded that the implications of stress and burnout are far-reaching:

Workplace stress and burnout among COs can lead to unsafe correctional facilities, high turnover rates, high absenteeism, lower productivity and decreased effectiveness in the workplace as well as negative personal and social outcomes like decreased life satisfaction and work-family conflict.

In fact, a 2014 paper for the National Institute of Corrections proposed a diagnostic category called “corrections fatigue,” which can have implications including “negative personality changes, socially dysfunctional thinking/ideology, and forms of declined health and functioning.” Those researchers further estimated that 20% of correctional officers experience corrections fatigue.

These consistent findings of rampant PTSD and depression among COs are remarkably similar to studies of incarcerated people. Research among incarcerated populations have found rates of PTSD at 48%. And much like corrections fatigue, researchers have identified “post-incarceration syndrome,” a subset of PTSD. In-depth interviews with 25 people who were incarcerated an average of 19 years revealed a “specific cluster of mental health symptoms,” including institutionalized personality traits, social-sensory disorientation, and alienation. These high rates among both prison staff and incarcerated individuals indicate that prisons themselves are unhealthy, dangerous spaces that contribute to serious and lasting mental health problems.

 

COs experience chronic pain and hypertension, and are exposed to illness and violence

Corrections work can take a physical toll as well. Nearly half (45%) of the surveyed correctional workers in Canada reported experiencing chronic pain, with lower back pain the most common complaint. Correctional officers are also disproportionately exposed to infectious diseases: The Covid Prison Project has tracked 277 deaths of correctional staff due to COVID-19, as of March 2022. (Of course, prison staff have contributed greatly to the spread of COVID behind bars: Throughout the country, staff vaccination rates lag far behind vaccination rates of incarcerated people, and many states failed to require staff to wear masks at the height of the pandemic.)

The stressful nature of the job brings other physical drawbacks. A 1983 study found that correctional officers had higher rates of hypertension (high blood pressure) and heart disease than the general population, both of which are linked to stress. And a 2015 study found extremely high baseline levels of hypertension and pre-hypertension among correctional officers. While hypertension usually shows up later in life, the study revealed high rates among COs ages 20 to 34 and 35 to 44.4

While estimates vary regarding the percentage of COs who are victims of violence on the job, it is clear that working in a prison comes with an increased risk of violence. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), for example, found that from 2005 to 2009, 33 out of every 1,000 COs reported experiencing workplace violence (defined as rape/sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated and simple assault).5 Compared to other professions in the study, this rate is lower only than bartenders, police officers, and security guards.6

Of course, when considering data on this type of violence, it is important to remember that it is self-reported by correctional officers, making it impossible to know what role they or their colleagues might have played in the reported incidents. COs are incentivized to report every possible incident as an assault, as a way of justifying budget and salary increases.

And it is clear that the constant fear of violence further adds to stress and negative mental health outcomes, and can contribute to job performance and turnover rates.7 In this way, too, COs’ risk of violence mirrors the experiences of incarcerated people.8

 

Prisons — no matter how modern — are depressing work environments

Back in 1982, a review of the stresses of prison work stated the obvious:

Any organization or social structure which consists of one group of people kept inside who do not want to be there and the other group who are there to make sure they stay in will be an organization under stress.

Investigative reporter Shane Bauer described corrections work in a similar way. In 2016, Bauer (who was previously incarcerated for two years in an Iranian prison), spent four months undercover as a CO in Winn Correctional Center, a private state prison in Louisiana. He later said of corrections officers, in his experience:

Most of them, when they go in, they want to treat prisoners well. But then you have to face the fact that you’re doing something that is not really within your normal realm of what it means to be a decent human being.

Multiple papers have noted that certain stressors are built into the corrections model, and are sometimes called “occupational” or “work-related.” As the author of an expansive 2013 literature review on wellness and safety among COs explains, much of the job of a correctional officer is boring and repetitive, yet the constant risk of violence and other incidents requires “hyper-vigilance, boundary setting and self-control. The constant state of alertness can be taxing both physically and psychologically.”

“We put on our armour. When you walk through the first gate, it clicks. And so does your back,” another former correctional officer from Oregon told the Guardian. He compared the job to being in a pressure cooker.

On top of the inherently stressful work environment, corrections jobs do not tend to open the door to desirable work in other industries. While former COs may go on to work in law enforcement or private security, these career paths are two of just three identified by the BJS as having higher exposure to workplace violence than corrections. Low wages are also often cited as a drawback of the job.

According to one Canadian corrections officer, who responded to a survey’s open-ended question about the job:

Corrections are a very mentally and physically demanding career that is very difficult to understand. Being keepers of people has demands that should not be misunderstood. This career is a meat grinder.

And in a white paper on correctional wellness titled “I Am Not Okay,” published by One Voice, the authors (who are correctional officers) described the reasons people go into corrections:

During childhood, kids regularly invent games where they imagine what they will be when they grow up. Many pretend to be police officers, nurses, doctors, lawyers, firefighters, or teachers. How many kids in the neighborhood grew up locking their friends in the basement because they wanted to be a correctional officer? How many seniors in the high school yearbook listed “correctional officer” as a career aspiration? Almost no one does that. No one wants to go to prison, even if they have the keys…

Some choose this path because they see it as an opportunity to help people “correct” their wrongdoings and come out better, but those for whom this was their motivation quickly find out that it’s not really an option, because the current system was not designed with this in mind.

 

But the correctional work environment is worse than it has to be

While some stressors of the job are inherent to the nature of locking people up, others stem from the way prisons are run in the United States. Sometimes called “organizational” or “institution-related” stressors, they contribute to stress and burnout, and can include:

  • Low autonomy/ no input into decision making
  • Unpredictable shift work
  • Overtime demands
  • Lack of support from or trust in supervisory staff
  • Inadequate benefits and resources
  • Inadequate training

Other significant “institution-related” stressors are role conflict and role ambiguity. Role conflict reflects fluctuating expectations over whether prisons are for punishment or rehabilitation. Role ambiguity is the uncertainty created when supervisors instruct COs to go “by the book,” even though it is clear to everyone that the role requires flexibility — and that the culture surrounding prison work encourages staff to carry out violent, informal sanctions that aren’t in any rulebook. As one paper described role ambiguity:

While officers work in a paramilitary organization marked by explicit lines of authority and a host of formal regulations, their task of managing inmates demands flexibility, the judicious application of discretionary justice, and the ability to secure inmate compliance through informal exchanges which deviate from written rules… Ambiguous and conflicting expectations are a likely result and a potential source of stress.

What’s more, negative experiences in prison may be exacerbated by the machismo culture in corrections. The 2013 literature review notes that, “like police officers, COs have subcultural taboos regarding the acknowledgement of a need for medical or psychological assistance, as such admissions are perceived as a sign of weakness.”

 

Bringing the problems home

Many correctional officers struggle to leave the job behind at the end of a shift, which is described by psychologists as “dual role conflict.” People often bring home the violence, hypervigilance, and command culture they experience all day, importing violence into their homes and communities. As the 2013 literature review explains:

It can be difficult for a CO to override innate and acquired characteristics that are considered functional and professional in the workplace, but are not effective at home or in their personal lives… For example, conflict can occur at home when excessive job stress causes a CO to displace frustration onto spouses and children, ordering family members in the same way he or she issues commands to inmates.

The review further notes that family conflict can be exacerbated by other features of the job, such as “cynicism, pessimism, sarcasm, flattened drama/stress response, and exposure to trauma and other disturbing behaviors.” All of this can lead to withdrawal and isolation at home.

A 2021 study of 156 correctional supervisors found correlations between exposure to traumatic incidents on the job and work-family conflict. And a 2013 paper included first-person accounts from Canadian correctional officers describing the effects the job has on them. As one CO explained it:

Prison staff learn to apply a thin layer of ‘Machismo’ as a result of each incident they respond to. It’s like a Band-Aid… It covers and seals in your emotions and your feelings; otherwise you’re weak, a punk, or a sissy… The only problem is the Band-Aids don’t come off after work. They stay on. So you live your life and miss all the beauty and the real experiences because you are a heartless, emotionally numb, and desensitized a__. You see an awful car accident with injuries, big deal. You have a friend that gets hurt really bad, big deal. Your family member dies in his fifties and you truly love the man, big deal. An inmate gets stabbed 47 times, big deal. You get mad because your kid wrecks his bike and cries because he skinned up his knees, big deal. Tell him to man-up and quit being a baby and walk away.

Shane Bauer, the undercover journalist, described how his personality changed as he worked in a prison:

It is getting in my blood… When I drive home, I wonder who I am becoming. I feel ashamed of my lack of self-control, my growing thirst for punishment and vengeance. I’m getting afraid of the expanding distance between the person I am at home and the one behind the wire. My glass of wine with dinner regularly becomes three. I hear the sounds of Ash unit as I fall asleep. I dream of monsters and men behind bars.

This can lead to dire outcomes. A 2011 study found that work-family conflict can contribute to depression among COs. And in a 2012 survey of 710 correctional officers in Florida, 33% reported they had heard of at least one correctional officer who committed unreported domestic violence.

 

Nurses, teachers, and other corrections workers face similar challenges

Although there is little research into the experiences of correctional nurses, teachers, and case managers, the little we know suggests that COs are not the only ones experiencing stress and trauma.

A 2019 exploratory study from the United Kingdom found that 57% of participating correctional mental health nurses had listened to people express thoughts of suicide and self-harm more than 30 times. Most had witnessed self-harm or attempted suicide.

Repeated exposure to this type of trauma can build up, just as it can for COs. “Vicarious” or “secondary” trauma can occur in people who are exposed to disturbing images and stories second-hand, and can have similar symptoms to PTSD. A 2019 study from Australia found that 87% of participating health staff at correctional centers experience high or moderate levels of vicarious trauma. Similarly, a 2011 study of educators in youth facilities found that 81% met at least one, 55% met two, and 39% met all three core diagnostic criteria for PTSD.

A 2006 study of workers in two unnamed midwestern prisons found even higher rates of burnout among case workers than correctional officers. And while little research exists on the physical health impact of this work, a study of correctional nurses found that 56% had short sleep duration and 32% had poor sleep quality.

 

Communities and counties should not seek new prisons and jails as job boosters

The overwhelming evidence shows that correctional work is stressful and traumatic. But for decades, rural communities throughout the country were persuaded to compete for prison contracts, and are now stuck with these jobs.

Not only are individual prison jobs difficult, but prisons as a whole have failed to revitalize the towns where they are built. In a 2002 report, Tracy Huling concluded that “increasing evidence suggests that by many measures prisons do not produce economic growth for local economies and can, over the long term, have detrimental effects on the social fabric and environment of rural communities.”

First, Huling noted that prisons often don’t hire locals. She cited Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s Golden Gulag, which includes a study of prison towns in California that showed that, on average, less than 20% of jobs in new state prisons went to current residents of the local town. Looking specifically at Corcoran, Calif., which housed two prisons, Gilmore further found that just 40% of the people working at those prisons lived within a 75 mile radius of the town. This happens in part because prison systems tend to promote from within.

Prisons can have other negative effects on a town’s economy. Citing work by economist Thomas Johnson, Huling noted that they generate few “linkages to the economy.” Unlike an auto plant, which might lead to the creation of new delivery companies, radio assemblers, and electronic harness makers, prisons do not attract new, related industries to the area. What’s more, prisons tend to attract chain stores, creating a “replacement” effect where locally-owned businesses lose out to the incoming McDonalds and Walmarts. Prison labor carried out by incarcerated people for the municipality or for private industry — which is already exploitative — can also displace local workers.

Too late, communities may find that, with all the small businesses gone, they have become dependent on their prisons — meaning that when states occasionally shutter prisons today, the news can be met with disappointment and fear.

Since Huling’s report, the literature continues to back her up. A 2008 literature review concluded:

“The 1990’s location of prisons in rural areas was based on a high dose of economic development hype and the hopes and expectations of local elected representatives, business and community leaders who believed state prisons were a ‘gold plated’ solution to their economic problems… Once more comprehensive and rigorous impact studies did emerge, they demonstrated that many of the apparent benefits of rural prison location for local communities were invalid.”

A 2010 study lead authored by Gregory Hooks similarly found that prison construction “impedes economic growth in rural counties.” Three Kentucky counties remain among the poorest in the nation after becoming home to federal prisons. And in 2016, an analysis of 25 years of prison building in Appalachia found “little evidence to support the claim that prisons are engines of growth,” and warned: “policymakers would be well served using great caution before pursuing this development pathway.”

Today, the prison-building boom has slowed, and county jails have become the new frontier of carceral expansion. From 2013 to 2019, jail populations grew 27% in rural areas and 7% in small-to-midsize cities, prompting many counties to build newer and bigger jails. In some states, this growth is accelerated by policies in which the state departments of corrections pay counties a per diem to house people serving state sentences. In Kentucky, for example, “at the same time that coal revenues dried up, the state’s criminal justice policies subsidized and incentivized the expansion of carceral capacity at the county level,” explain Jack Norton and Judah Schept. But, like the prison boom jobs before them, jobs in these new, expanded jails should not be desirable to individual workers or communities.

Prisons bring trauma into communities — for the people locked up in them, of course, but for those employed there as well. There are other ways to create better, safer jobs for people in rural communities. In particular, states have the power to create different kinds of jobs — such as jobs in mental health services, youth programming, or health care — that simultaneously help others stay out of jail and prison in the first place.

 

Footnotes

  1. Recently, the Montana DOC reported it has a three-year statewide corrections turnover rate of 23%. In South Dakota prisons, 28% of officers left their jobs in FY2020. Two Virginia prisons had turnover rates of 54% and 46% in 2021. Across Georgia’s youth facilities, 90% of entry-level officers left the jobs within their first year in FY 2021; this actually marked an improvement from 97% the year before. And in Colorado, two private prisons recently reported staff turnover rates of 126% and 107% in 2021, meaning that the number of people who quit over the course of the year was higher than the average number of COs employed there.  ↩

  2. Some facilities have people working “six or seven days a week, 10- to 12- and sometimes 16-hour shifts.” Federal prisons, for example, are so short-staffed, they are forcing nurses, cooks, and case workers to work security roles.  ↩

  3. In recent years, many states have resorted to lowering the eligibility requirements for COs. Arizona shortened hiring timelines by no longer checking candidate references. In 2018, Michigan started allowing COs to complete the required 15 hours of college credits after starting the job. In 2019, Florida lowered the age of eligibility from 19 to 18, and the Oklahoma Department of Corrections recently asked the legislature to lower it from 20 to 18. This isn’t a new idea either: When Kansas lowered the age of eligibility from 21 to 19 in 2001, the New York Times announced, “Desperate for Prison Guards, Some States Even Rob Cradles.”  ↩

  4. Articles about correctional work sometimes cite a statistic that COs have an average life expectancy of just 59 years — 16 years below the national average. But as Politifact breaks down succinctly (in response to a Rhode Island corrections union president who made a similar assertion), the evidence does not support this claim.  ↩

  5. In a finding somewhat similar to the BJS estimate of 33 per 1,000 COs experiencing workplace violence, an analysis of 2011 incidents found 254 work-related injuries per 10,000 full-time corrections employees as the result of assaults and violent acts, or a rate of 25.4 per 1,000 COs. A much lower rate was reported in a 2011 analysis of assaults coded as “serious” by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice: 284 per 100,000 staff members, or a rate of just 2.84 per 1,000 COs. (The paper notes, however, that only a small percentage of total assaults on staff were marked as “serious.”)  ↩

  6. Two additional professions in the BJS study also reported higher rates of workplace violence than correctional officers, but had very small sample sizes: mental health custodial care workers, and teachers at technical and industrial schools.  ↩

  7. COs may perceive their risks of physical violence and illness as even higher than they are, which can contribute to stress and take a mental toll. A 2017 literature review found eight studies that looked at correctional officers’ perceptions of workplace safety and wellness. One of the studies, from 2005, found that over 92% believed they were at risk of contracting either HIV/AIDS or Hepatitis B or C. Another survey, from 2013, revealed that 78% of CO respondents were at least “somewhat afraid” of victimization by incarcerated people. And a 2014 study asked COs to assess their risk of injury from six different workplace dangers (such as gangs and contraband); the majority of the sample perceived a high risk from each danger. What’s more, COs who had been on the job longer were more likely to perceive a risk of injury.  ↩

  8. Incarcerated people face an extremely elevated risk of violence at the hands of staff and other incarcerated people. A 2009 study found that 35% of incarcerated men experienced physical victimization and 10% experienced sexual victimization behind bars; among women, the rates were 24% and 25% respectively.  ↩


58% of all women in U.S. prisons are mothers, and other important facts to know this Mother’s Day.

by Wendy Sawyer and Wanda Bertram, May 4, 2022

This Mother’s Day — as the COVID-19 pandemic continues to put people behind bars at risk — nearly 150,000 incarcerated mothers will spend the day apart from their children.1 Over half (58%) of all women in U.S. prisons are mothers, as are 80% of women in jails, including many who are incarcerated awaiting trial simply because they can’t afford bail.

How up-to-date are these numbers?

These estimates are based on a typical, pre-pandemic year. And 2020, the most recent year with data, was anything but “typical”…

To be clear, these estimates are based on the most recent numbers we have that represent a “typical” year. Of course, very little has been “typical” since the pandemic began, so we rely on pre-pandemic data from 2019 for our estimates. The most recent national government data, from 2020, show dramatic changes in incarceration from previous years, but other data sources we’ve monitored throughout the pandemic indicate that jail populations have largely rebounded since then, and many state prison populations have also started to tick back up. Since nationally representative 2021 data will not be published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics until later in 2022, we use 2019 data to provide the most recent picture of incarceration in a “typical” pre-pandemic year.

Most of these women are incarcerated for drug and property offenses, often stemming from poverty and/or substance use disorders. Most are also the primary caretakers of their children, meaning that punishing them with incarceration tears their children away from a vital source of support. And these numbers don’t cover the many women preparing to become mothers while locked up this year: An estimated 58,000 people every year are pregnant when they enter local jails or prisons.2

150,000 mothers separated from their children this Mother’s Day is atrocious in and of itself – but that’s just one day. How many people in the U.S. have experienced separation from their mothers due to incarceration over the years? Unfortunately, these specific data are not collected, but we calculated some rough estimates based on other research to attempt to answer this question:3

  • Roughly 570,000 women living in the U.S. had ever been separated from their minor children by a period of imprisonment as of 2010.
  • An estimated 1.3 million people living in the U.S. had been separated from their mothers before their 18th birthdays due to their mothers’ imprisonment, also as of 2010.4

The scale of maternal incarceration – and its related harms – is monumental. But to be clear, these are estimates of how many children there were among the roughly 1 million women alive in 2010 who had ever been to prison, and only includes children who were minors when their mothers were in prison. These estimates are therefore very conservative, as they do not include the many, many more women who have ever been booked into a local jail.

Most incarcerated mothers are locked up in local jails

Women incarcerated in the U.S. are disproportionately in jails rather than prisons. As we’ve written before, even a short jail stay can be devastating, especially when it separates a mother from children who depend on her.

Graph showing number of women jailed each year and percentage who are mothers.Estimates have been rounded for this graphic. Sources: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime Data Explorer (2019 table “Female Arrests by Age”) and Vera Institute of Justice, Overlooked: Women in Jails in an Era of Reform.

80% of the women who will go to jail this year are mothers — including 55,000 women who are pregnant when they are admitted. Beyond having to leave their children in someone else’s care, these women will be impacted by the brutal side effects of going to jail: Aggravation of mental health problems, a greater risk of suicide, and a much higher likelihood of ending up homeless or deprived of essential financial benefits.

How incarceration — and life after incarceration — hurts mothers and their children

Women who are pregnant when they are locked up have to contend with a healthcare system that frequently neglects and abuses patients. In a 50-state survey of state prison systems’ healthcare policies, we found that many states fail to meet even basic standards of care for expectant mothers, like providing screening and treatment for high-risk pregnancies. In local jails, where tens of thousands of pregnant women will spend time this year, healthcare is often even worse (across the board) than in state or federal prisons.

More challenges await incarcerated mothers and pregnant women when they are released from jail or prison. Formerly incarcerated women experience extremely high rates of food insecurity, according to a 2019 study. And as we previously reported, the 1.9 million women released from prisons and jails every year have high rates of poverty, unemployment, and homelessness, confirming what many advocates already knew: that there is a shortage of agencies and organizations able and willing to help formerly incarcerated women restart their lives.

It’s time we recognized that when we put women in jail, we inflict potentially irreparable damage to their families. Most women who are incarcerated would be better served though alternatives in their communities.

So would their kids. Keeping parents out of jail and prison is critical to protect children from the known harms of parental incarceration, including:

Incarceration punishes more than just individuals; entire families suffer the effects long after a sentence ends. Mother’s Day reminds us again that people behind bars are not nameless “offenders,” but beloved family members and friends whose presence — and absence — matters.

 
 

Footnotes

  1. Based on the most recent (2016) Survey of Prison Inmates, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) estimates 57,700 women in state and federal prisons are parents of minor children. We calculated approximately 55,142 mothers of minor children in local jails based on the Vera Institute of Justice report’s estimate that 80% of women in jail are mothers, and the BJS estimate of 110,500 women in local jails at mid-year 2019 (80% of 110,500 is 88,400). While jail populations dropped quite dramatically in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, we opted to use the more typical 2019 jail population for our estimate because other data sources show that jail populations have largely rebounded since mid-2020, but national 2021 data from BJS are not yet available.  ↩

  2. These estimates are based on the following percentages, reported in the linked sources: 4% of women admitted to state and federal prisons annually, and 3% of women admitted to local jails, are pregnant at the time of admission. The estimated 55,000 women admitted to jails while pregnant each year is based on the number of women over age 18 arrested in 2017 (over 1.7 million women), as reported in the original source. The estimated number of pregnant women admitted to state and federal prisons in a year is based on the total number of female admissions in 2019 (73,586) as reported by the Bureau of Justice Statistics CSAT — Prisoners tool (4% of 73,586 is 2,943.) While prison populations – especially admissions – dropped quite dramatically in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we chose to use the more typical 2019 prison data because other sources show that prison populations have since started to tick back up, but national 2021 data are not yet available. In contrast to the annual admission numbers, the share of women in prison who are pregnant on any given day (the “one-day prevalence” of pregnancy) was 0.6% in prisons and 3.5% in local jails as of the end of 2016.  ↩

  3. Both of these estimates are based on Shannon, et al.’ s estimates of the number of living U.S. residents who have been in prison at some point, as of 2010. We combine their findings with the most recent data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics about parents in prison and their children. But to do so, we have to make some assumptions – namely, that the percentage of women in prison who are mothers of minor children has remained more or less constant over the years, and that the average number of minor children per woman in prison has also remained constant over the years. To see how much these measures have changed over time, we reviewed Bureau of Justice Statistics reports about parents in prison and their children dating back to 1991, and found that between 1991 and 2016, the percentage of women prison who are mothers of minor children fell from 67% to 58% in state prisons and from 61% to 58% in federal prisons. At the same time, the average number of minor children per incarcerated mother has increased slightly from about 2.16 children in 1991 to 2.28 in 2016. These changes over time are not dramatic, but our resulting estimates should still be viewed as very rough estimates.  ↩

  4. Here’s the math behind our estimates: Shannon, et al. (2017) estimated 7,304,910 (or 3.11%) adults alive in the U.S. in 2010 had ever been in prison or on parole (whether still in prison or after release). They also estimated that 5.55% of the adult male population in 2010 had ever been in prison or on parole (they did not publish an estimated percentage of the adult female population that had been imprisoned). Based on Census data, we calculated an estimated 6,317,909 living adult males who had ever been in prison as of 2010 from that percentage. We then subtracted the number of adult males who had ever been in prison from the total number of adults who had ever been in prison; the difference – about 987,000 – is the number of adult women who had ever been in prison. Then, we took 57.7% of that total (0.577 * 987,000) to estimate that 569,500 (or roughly 570,000) of those women had been mothers of minor children while incarcerated (in 2016, 57.7% of women in prison had minor children). Finally, to estimate the number of people in 2010 who were minor children when their mothers were in prison, we multiplied the average number of minor children per woman with minor children in prison in 2016, 2.28 children, by our estimate of the number of women alive in 2010 who had been incarcerated when they had minor children (569,500) – 1,301,182 people.  ↩


We examined release card companies’ fee structures to learn how this industry has evolved, and what government leaders can do to stop its worst practices.

by Stephen Raher, May 3, 2022

Every year, roughly 5 million people are released from jail and another half million leave prison. But just because they are released from physical custody doesn’t mean that they are free of the financial exploitation resulting from that experience.

When a person leaves a correctional facility, they often receive their funds — wages earned while behind bars, support from family members, or money the person had in their possession when arrested — on fee-laden prepaid debit cards. As we explain below, there are several ways (six, to be precise) to get money off of a release card, but they are expensive, difficult, or both.

We first put a spotlight on these “release cards” in 2015, when they came on the scene as one of the newer ventures from companies that have traditionally profited by charging incarcerated people and their families exorbitant rates for phone calls, money transfers, or other technological services. While release cards were novel in 2015, they are now ubiquitous. Since then, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has reined in some of the industry’s worst practices and cracked down on one of the biggest players in the industry, but these companies continue to line their pockets at the expense of low-income individuals who are trying to navigate the reentry process. As the CFPB’s director recently noted, some release-card companies have made a practice of “siphoning off…people’s own hard-earned money” through abusive practices that sometimes violate federal law.

To better understand how these companies continue to unfairly extract money from consumers — and more importantly, what can be done to stop them — we analyzed the most recent fee disclosures that release-card companies filed with the CFPB. The data (which are summarized in the appendix1) paint a picture of a complex obstacle course, riddled with pitfalls that deprive formerly incarcerated people of the modest amount of money they have when they are released.

 
 

The six ways release-card companies grab people’s money

When someone is given a release card on their way out of a prison or jail, they have up to six ways to use its value, but each option entails different challenges, and most involve fees.

Chart of ways to get money off a release card and associated fees

Option #1: Opt out (but the clock starts ticking at the moment of release)

The first way someone can get their money off of a release card is by exercising their right to “opt out” and get a refund.

While this may sound easy, it will come as no surprise that release-card companies make it difficult (or nearly impossible) for recently released people to exercise their opt-out rights. Cardholders face four primary hurdles:

  1. First, the cardholder must act quickly. They have to notify the company they want a refund within an arbitrary “grace period” to avoid being hit with maintenance fees. These grace periods are generally between two and thirty days, creating an unnecessary obstacle at a time when the cardholder is trying to secure housing and employment, and (if on parole) comply with terms of supervised release.2
  2. Second, opting out generally requires that the cardholder call customer service or make a web-based request to close the account. The problem here is that people recently released from custody frequently lack reliable phone or internet service.
  3. Third, the cardholder cannot use the card for even a single transaction, effectively freezing their money at a time when they need it most.
  4. Finally, refunds are generally sent via a mailed check, even though recently released people are likely to need time to establish a mailing address and are unlikely to be able to wait for the time required under the U.S. Postal Service’s degraded delivery standards.
Chart showing most release cards charge maintenance fees

A full breakdown of fees charged by each card type is available in the appendix.

If someone receives a release card that charges a periodic maintenance fee and they do not close their account within the grace period, then the maintenance fees will be deducted from their card balance every week or month. Almost three-quarters of the release-cards we reviewed charge “account maintenance” fees.

Option #2: Close the account after the opt-out period has expired

After the grace period has expired, a cardholder can request that the account be closed and receive a refund via mailed check. Seventeen release cards (all managed by Numi Financial) charge a steep $9.95 fee for this service, meaning anyone with a balance of less than $10 can’t take advantage of this option. Someone with a $50 balance can use this option, but effectively has to pay a fee of 20% for a very simple transaction.

Option #3: Transfer the money to a bank account (if you have one)

Some cardholders can transfer their balance to a bank account. Two of the three dominant release card brands (Access Corrections and Numi) appear to allow cardholders to transfer their funds to a bank account without paying a fee.3 However, the companies do not provide much detail about how to do this, beyond referring consumers to the program manager’s website. While this may be useful for cardholders with bank accounts, most people being released from long terms of incarceration don’t have bank accounts, effectively eliminating this option for them.

Option #4: Use the card to make purchases

Holders of release cards can use their balances to make in-store or online purchases. This only works if the business in question accepts Mastercard. While many retailers do, some important businesses (like landlords) do not.

But even if a cardholder wants to use the card at a Mastercard-accepting business, simply using the card for purchases can subject them to a whole new series of fees. Some cards charge users for each purchase (seven cards levy such fees, averaging 71¢ per transaction). These fees are hard to justify because card companies are already compensated for the cost of processing transactions through interchange fees paid by merchants.4

Half of the cards we examined charge fees for declined transactions, with an average fee of 62¢. These fees are even more difficult to justify because it doesn’t appear that card issuers incur any expense when a purchase request is declined. These fees seem to be nothing more than corporate enrichment at the expense of consumers who are least able to absorb these costs.

Finally, don’t forget that for cards with periodic maintenance fees, the longer it takes the consumer to spend down their balance, the more they will pay in weekly or monthly maintenance fees.

Option #5: Get cash at an ATM

Getting cash from an ATM also presents its own challenges and fees.

Some card companies offer a network of ATMs where customers can withdraw their money for free, or a relatively low fee. However, if the cardholder uses an ATM outside of this network, they’re likely to be hit with fees by both the card issuer and the bank that operates the ATM. Twenty-nine release cards (60% of our data set) impose fees for ATM withdrawals — with an average fee of $2.58 per transaction. Sometimes these fees apply only to out-of-network ATMs, but some cards charge the fee for all ATM transactions.

Finally, twenty-four cards impose a fee for declined ATM transactions (with an average fee of 62¢). To avoid a declined-ATM-withdraw fee, a cardholder may want to check their available balance, but doing that at an ATM carries a fee — ranging from 50¢ to $1.50 — on thirty-seven release cards (77% of the data set).

Chart showing ATM fees can quickly eat the balance on release cards A full breakdown of fees charged by each card type is available in the appendix.

Option #6: Withdraw cash at a bank

Over-the-counter withdrawals appear to often be fee-free, but figuring out how to use this option can be nearly impossible. For example, the cardholder agreement for Axiom Bank’s release cards (branded as Access Corrections cards) states that cardholders must perform over-the-counter withdrawals at a “MasterCard principal financial institution,” but neither Axiom or Mastercard itself provides information on how to determine which bank branches fall within this category. Similarly, Central Bank of Kansas City (a partner with Numi Financial) also fails to inform customers where they can make over-the-counter withdrawals, but cardholder materials do warn that banks offering this service may impose their own fees.

 
 

Making release cards work for recently released people

All too often, correctional facilities use release cards without giving any thought to the experience of the person being released from custody. For a short stint in jail — a few days or hours — simply returning a person’s cash to them upon release is almost always the best option. If someone spends a longer time in custody, though, and accumulates a balance in their “trust account,” a prepaid debit card may be a convenient way to give someone their money, especially if there are few (or no) fees and cardholders have free and easy-to-use options to transfer the balance or turn it into cash.

The real problem here isn’t release cards themselves; it’s the abusive fees and practices that are common in the industry today.

Correctional agencies can take steps to end some of the most outrageous release-card practices. For example, we identified one release card in the CFPB database that stands out in a good way: the Comerica Bank card used by the North Dakota Department of Corrections. This card has relatively few fees compared to other companies: just an inactivity fee of $2/month that kicks in if the card hasn’t been used for twelve consecutive months, a $10 fee for expedited replacement of a lost card via overnight mail (a replacement card via first-class mail is free), and a few ATM fees.5 It’s also the only card we reviewed that doesn’t include a mandatory arbitration provision. How did such a small prison system get such a good deal? Because the North Dakota Department of Corrections joined with other state agencies that use prepaid debit cards (for payments like unemployment benefits) to negotiate a group contract with decent consumer protections. It’s a practice more states can and should adopt.

State legislatures can also crack down on bad release-card deals. We’ve drafted simple model legislation that prevents most of the worst practices in the industry.

Finally, the federal government has a role to play in making these cards work better for consumers. The CFPB is currently looking at “junk fees” charged in connection with consumer financial products. These are fees that don’t serve any real purpose other than to pad the bottom lines of the companies that charge them. We filed comments asking the CFPB to finish the work it started when it fined JPay last year. We encouraged the agency to crack down on some of the worst practices across the release card industry, in addition to addressing the equally abusive fees charged for money transfers to incarcerated people.

Release cards shouldn’t be a tool for taking money from those who can least afford it. Prison and jail officials, along with state and federal leaders, have a responsibility to ensure the little bit of money that recently released people have is not quickly drained by hidden or inescapable fees. States and counties should follow the lead of North Dakota by leveraging their power to negotiate a contract that minimizes fees; state legislatures should prohibit the industry’s worst practices; and the CFPB should continue to police companies in this sector.

 
 

Appendix

Disclosure concerning JPay data: With one exception, JPay has not uploaded long-form fee disclosures, thus, it is impossible to know the full range of fees. In addition, many of the fees JPay used to charge are now prohibited under the terms of the consent order entered in Admin. Proc. 2021-CFPB-0006. This table includes any fees listed in JPay’s short-form disclosures, even though this information is likely out of date. If information in the CFPB database clearly establishes that a particular fee is not charged for a JPay release card, that fee is denoted as “–“; otherwise, if a fee could possibly be listed on the (unfiled) long-form disclosure, it is denoted as “Unknown”. JPay’s entries in the CFPB database also consistently fail to list the correctional agencies where any given card is used. When the database includes older (superseded) account agreements that do identify correctional agencies where cards were issued, we have listed those agencies here.
Account Maintenance Fees Transaction Fees ATM Fees Inactivity Fees and Policies Other Information
CFPB Database ID Issuer Program Manager Correctional Agency Weekly Fee Monthly Fee Grace Period Purchase Fee Declined Purchase Balance Inquiry Withdrawal Declined Transaction Inactivity Fees and Policies Inactivity Period Fee to Refund/Close Account Miscellaneous Fees Effective Date of Cardholder Agreement
C 10 AF Legacy (158574) Axiom Bank Rapid Financial 2.50 3 days 1.50 2.95 2.95 card replacement (2.99) 1/10/20
C 10 Legacy AF ALDOC (158575) Axiom Bank Rapid Financial Alabama DOC 1.50 5 days 1.50 2.75 2.75 card replacement (2.99) 1/10/20
C 11 AF ALDOC WR1 (158576) Axiom Bank Rapid Financial Alabama DOC 1.50 2.95 2.95 2.00/week 90 days card replacement (2.99) 1/10/20
C 12 AF WR NMF (158577) Axiom Bank Rapid Financial 1.50 2.95 2.95 2.00/week 90 days card replacement (2.99) 1/10/20
C 13 AF AL DOC (158578) Axiom Bank Rapid Financial Alabama DOC 1.50 5 days 1.50 2.75 2.75 card replacement (2.99) 1/10/20
C 14 Legacy AF (158579) Axiom Bank Rapid Financial 2.50 3 days 1.50 2.95 2.95 card replacement (2.99) 1/10/20
C 15 NV DOC (158580) Axiom Bank Rapid Financial Nevada DOC 1.50 3 days after activiation (or 90 days after issuance, if not activated) 1.50 2.75 2.75 card replacement (2.99) 1/10/20
C 18 IA DOC (158581) Axiom Bank Rapid Financial Iowa DOC 1.50 2.95 2.95 2.00/week 180 days card replacement (2.99) 1/10/20
C 20 GEO Legacy (158582) Axiom Bank Rapid Financial GEO Group 2.00/week 180 days 1/10/20
C 22 CADDO PARISH WR (158583) Axiom Bank Rapid Financial Caddo Parish (LA) 2.00 3 days 1.50 no ATM usage allowed card replacement (2.99) 1/10/20
C 40 RP (158584) Axiom Bank Rapid Financial 2.50 3 days 1.50 2.95 2.95 card replacement (2.99) 1/10/20
C 45 Legacy RP (158585) Axiom Bank Rapid Financial 2.50 3 days 1.50 2.95 2.95 card replacement (2.99) 1/10/20
Elan Prepaid (44557) US Bank Nebraska DOCS 1.00 (out of network only) 1.25 (out of network only) 2.00/mo 270 days not disclosed Card replacement (5.00, or 10.00 for expedited), int’l (vars) 10/12/21
Elan Prepaid (44555) US Bank Arkansas DOC; Hampden County 2.00 none listed 0.50 (out of network only) 0.99 (out of network only) not disclosed Card replacement (5.00), bank withdrawal (3.00) 10/12/21
ND-Department of Corrections (46984) Comerica North Dakota DOC 1.25 (out of network only) 2.00/mo 12 months Expedited card replacement ($10) 4/1/19
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version 1B (199643) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 2.50 3 days 0.50 1.00 2.95 1.00 9.95 4/6/20
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version 1C (199644) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 2.50 3 days 0.50 1.00 2.95 1.00 9.95 4/6/20
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version 1CNO (199645) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 2.50 3 days 1.00 2.95 1.00 9.95 9/24/20
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version 3B (199646) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 2.50 3 days 0.95 (PIN only) 0.50 1.00 (out of network only) 1.00 9.95 4/6/20
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version 4B (199647) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 2.50 7 days 0.50 1.00 1.00 9.95 4/6/20
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version 6B (199648) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 2.50 2 years 1.00 (PIN only) 0.50 1.00 2.95 1.00 9.95 4/6/20
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version 7B (199649) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 5.95 5 days 0.50 1.00 2.95 1.00 9.95 4/6/20
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version 7C (199650) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 5.95 5 days 0.50 1.00 2.95 1.00 9.95 4/6/20
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version 7CNO (199651) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 5.95 5 days 1.00 2.95 1.00 9.95 4/6/20
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version 7D (199652) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 5.95 15 days 0.50 1.00 2.95 1.00 9.95 4/6/20
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version DOC1 (199653) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 4/6/20
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version DOC2 (199654) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 2.50 60 days 1.00 (out of network only) 1.00 4/6/20
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version DOC3 (199655) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 5.95 5 days 0.50 1.00 2.95 1.00 9.95 4/6/20
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version DOC4 (199656) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 0.50 1.00 (out of network only) 0.95 3.00/mo 180 days 9.95 11/17/20
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version DOC5 (199657) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 5.95 60 days 0.50 1.00 (out of network only) 0.95 9.95 4/6/20
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version FSPA (199658) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 0.50 0.95 1.95/mo 180 days 4/6/20
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version SPA (199659) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 4.95 30 days 0.50 1.00 (out of network only) 2.95 (out of network only) 0.95 9.95 4/6/20
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version SPA15 (199660) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 5.95 15 days 0.50 1.00 (out of network only) 0.95 9.95 4/6/20
Prestige Prepaid Mastercard version WKA (199661) Central Bank of Kansas City Numi Financial 2.50 3 days 0.45 (PIN only) 0.50 1.00 2.95 1.00 9.95 4/6/20
JPay California (46811) Metropolitan Commercial Bank Praxell, Inc. California 3.00 7 days Unknown 1.00 Unknown 1.00 Unknown 4 other types of fees noted on short form disclosure 2/9/21
JPay Colorado (46828) Metropolitan Commercial Bank Praxell, Inc. Colorado 0.50 7 days 0.70 0.50 0.50 2.00 0.50 2.99/mo 90 days Unknown Phone cust serv. ($1); 5 other types of fees noted on short-form disclosure 2/9/21
JPay Florida (46829) Metropolitan Commercial Bank Praxell, Inc. Florida; New York work release; Tennessee work release 2/9/21
JPay Georgia (46830) Metropolitan Commercial Bank Praxell, Inc. Georgia, Arizona, Lousiana 3.00/mo 90 days 2/9/21
JPay Kentucky (46832) Metropolitan Commercial Bank Praxell, Inc. Kentucky Unknown 0.50 0.50 2.00 0.50 2.99/mo 90 days Unknown 7 other types of fees noted on short-form disclosure 2/9/21
JPay Milwaukee (46834) Metropolitan Commercial Bank Praxell, Inc. Milwaukee, WI 6.00 7 days 0.50 0.50 Unknown 5 other types of fees noted on short form disclosure 4/1/21
JPay Missouri (46839) Metropolitan Commercial Bank Praxell, Inc. Missouri Unknown 1.95 1.50 Unknown 2.99/mo 90 days Unknown Card replacement ($5); 5 other types of fees noted on short-form disclosure 2/10/21
JPay MN (46840) Metropolitan Commercial Bank Praxell, Inc. Indiana, Tennessee 2.00 7 days 0.70 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.99/mo 90 days Unknown 6 other types of fees noted on short-form disclosure 2/24/21
JPay New Jersey (46835) Metropolitan Commercial Bank Praxell, Inc. New Jersey 2.00 7 days Card replacement ($5) 2/24/21
JPay New York (46836) Metropolitan Commercial Bank Praxell, Inc. New York 2.00 7 days 0.50 1.00 0.50 2.00 0.70 Unknown 8 other types of fees noted on short-form disclosure 4/10/21
JPay New York 2 (188075) Metropolitan Commercial Bank Praxell, Inc. Unknown 7 days 0.50 0.50 0.70 2.99/mo 90 days Unknown 9 other types of fees noted on short-form disclosure 4/10/21
JPay Ohio (46837) Metropolitan Commercial Bank Praxell, Inc. Ohio 1.00 7 days Unknown 0.50 0.50 3.00/mo 90 days Unknown Card replacement ($8); 5 other types of fees noted on short-form disclosure 4/1/21
JPay Oklahoma (46838) Metropolitan Commercial Bank Praxell, Inc. Oklahoma, North Carolina 6.00 7 days Unknown Unknown Unknown Card activation ($3); card replacement ($6); 3 other types of fees noted on short-form disclosure. 2/24/21
JPay (TN, IN, VA) (46841) Metropolitan Commercial Bank Praxell, Inc. Tennessee, Indiana, Virginia 0.50 30 days 0.70 0.50 0.50 2.00 0.50 2.99/mo 90 days 9.95 Phone cust serv. ($1), card replacement ($5) 6/16/20

See the full appendix

 
 

Footnotes

  1. It appears the data JPay filed with the CFPB may be out of date. Last year, the company signed a consent order with the CFPB banning it from charging most fees, however it has not updated its filings with the Bureau. For this analysis, we’ve used the most recent filings from the company, even though they are likely out of date, because they reflect the state of the market prior to the enforcement action, and where the market may return upon the expiration of the consent order in 2026.  ↩

  2. Not only are grace periods arbitrary, but they likely have a more troublesome purpose, as we explain in our recent filing with the CFPB. Consumer-rights activists have had a fairly good track record suing release-card companies for various legal violations. The companies try to keep these suits out of court by relying on the arbitration provisions in the fine-print terms of service, but most courts that have confronted these disputes have held the arbitration provisions unenforceable because cardholders do not voluntarily agree to them. Grace periods are likely an industry strategy to defeat future litigation: by offering someone a few days to opt out of using a card, the company can then argue that anyone who doesn’t opt out has “voluntarily” agreed to all the terms and conditions buried in the card’s fine print.  ↩

  3. We assume the third company, JPay, doesn’t charge a fee to transfer money to a bank account under the terms of the CFPB consent order. However, as explained in footnote 1, we can’t be certain of this because the company has not updated its filings with the CFPB.  ↩

  4. Mastercard rules specify that costs of operating the network are to be borne by the financial institutions that are members of the Mastercard network. Thus, collecting fee revenue from cardholders for processing purchase transactions looks like a form of double recovery. See Mastercard Rules S 3.4 (Dec. 7, 2021).  ↩

  5. There is a $1.25 for out-of-network ATM withdrawals, but cardholders get two free out-of-network withdrawals each month. There are also fees for ATM transactions outside the U.S, which is fairly common across most prepaid cards. Even with these fees, when examined as a whole and compared to other release cards being used, the North Dakota fee structure seems fairly good.  ↩


We look at the experiences of 29 incarcerated transgender people before and during their incarceration.

by Tiana Herring and Emily Widra, March 31, 2022

Nearly 5,000 transgender people are incarcerated in state prisons, but we know very little about their lives before prison or their experiences during incarceration. To add to this limited body of research, we’ve analyzed the Survey of Prison Inmates, 2016 data, released in late 2020, which provides a glimpse into this overrepresented but understudied population. The small number of trans respondents to the Survey of Prison Inmates — only 29 trans people — limits our ability to generalize the data; however, the results from this study are worth exploring given the lack of information about trans people in prisons. Our findings help give greater visibility and understanding about the respondents’ lives, experiences, and challenges before and during their incarceration.

Because of the small sample of 29 trans respondents, we elected to avoid presenting percentages that could lead to misleading generalizations and instead focused on the raw data we could access from the Survey of Prison Inmates.

Here’s a glimpse into what we were able to learn from these 29 individuals:

  • Most of the trans people surveyed were people of color, lesbian, gay, or bisexual (LGB), and relatively young.
  • The trans people surveyed reported experiencing a variety of adverse experiences before turning 18, such as homelessness, foster care placements, arrest, and incarceration in juvenile facilities.
  • Many of the trans people surveyed participated in job training and educational programming, likely to make up for missed opportunities before incarceration (such as educational exclusion and higher risk for unemployment).

We know trans people in prison exist at the intersection of a number of oppressed identities. But beyond that, before this data was released, what we knew about the trans population in prison was limited to the reports published by the National Center for Transgender Equality.1 The Survey of Prison Inmates data adds to this previous work to provide a clearer picture of the actual lived experiences of incarcerated trans people, giving us a window in which to observe — and subsequently address — what trans people face behind bars and what factors may contribute to the likelihood trans people will come into contact with the criminal legal system.

Demographics of the 29 incarcerated trans people surveyed

The LGBTQ+ population is overrepresented at every stage of the criminal legal system. To look more specifically at the transgender population — which is often not distinguished from the LGB population in available data — we need to look at the demographics and see just how the trans population compares to the general prison population. From what we can tell from this small sample, the trans people surveyed tend to be more diverse in terms of their race/ethnicity and sexual orientation, and skewed younger in age.

Race and ethnicity. The vast majority (23) of the trans people surveyed were people of color. Eight were Hispanic, eight were Black, and seven identified with two or more races. Meanwhile, the overall prison population is about 32% white, 34% Black, 21% Hispanic, and 11% two or more races. This is generally in line with other studies which have found that trans people of color have especially high lifetime rates of incarceration.

chart showing most of the 29 trans survey respondents are not white

Sexual orientation. Additionally, more than half (17) of the incarcerated trans respondents identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or something else other than straight. By contrast, 96% of the entire state prison population identifies as straight, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ analysis of the same data.

chart showing most of the 29 trans survey respondents are not straight

Age. Most (15) of the incarcerated trans people surveyed were under the age of 34, younger than the average age of 39 of all people held in state prisons nationwide. Evidence suggests that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans youth — and especially trans youth of color — are at especially high risk for contact with the criminal legal system compared to the general U.S. population.

 

Even before incarceration, these trans people were at a disadvantage

In general, people in prison have experienced multiple hardships, such as repeated arrests and low educational attainment, and this remains particularly true for the 29 trans respondents.

Housing and poverty. About a quarter (8) of the trans respondents reported homelessness before age 18 and 13 trans respondents lived in foster care or an institution (like a group home) before age 18. Additionally, 12 of these trans people’s families received welfare/public assistance before they were 18, adding another layer of disadvantage, as children who grow up in poverty are at greater risk for behavioral problems, chronic health issues, and poor academic achievement.

chart showing many of the 29 trans respondents were homeless, lived in foster care, or received public assistance as youth

Arrests and juvenile facilities. Most (16) trans people surveyed reported being arrested for the first time when they were 18 or younger, and many (12) spent time in a juvenile facility. Involvement in the criminal legal system at a young age is a fairly common experience for LGBTQ+ youth who are overrepresented in the juvenile justice system. Juvenile detention can be especially dangerous for trans youth who overwhelmingly report feeling unsafe in these facilities, and can be subject to solitary confinement ”for their protection.”

chart showing 16 trans respondents were first arrested under 18 years old and 12 spent time in a juvenile facility

Education. The majority (19) of the trans people surveyed did not finish high school. Other studies have shown that outside of prison, trans students are more likely to report that they may not complete high school. Over 84% of trans students surveyed in 2019 reported feeling unsafe in school because of their gender, and a similar portion of trans students said they had been victimized in school because of their gender and gender expression. Interestingly, three of the trans people who responded to the Survey of Prison Inmates reported graduating from college. While we advise against generalizing this finding too broadly, this is a notable share of the trans respondents (12%). In comparison, only 4% of the entire surveyed state prison population reported earning a college degree.

Employment. Given that so many of the trans respondents were excluded from educational opportunities, it’s unsurprising that they also report low rates of pre-prison employment:2 less than half (13) of the trans people surveyed were employed in the month before their arrest.

Past criminal justice history. When asked about past involvement with the criminal legal system, the vast majority of trans people surveyed (23) reported having been on probation before, and over a third (11) had served time in jail at least twice before. Even short stays in jail can have detrimental effects on an individual’s employment, housing, financial stability, and family wellbeing. And previous research has shown that trans people are at an elevated risk of unemployment, unstable housing, and being disconnected from their families even without the added layer of criminal justice involvement.

It’s perhaps unsurprising that many of the trans people surveyed reported prior interactions with the criminal legal system given that trans people are criminalized and discriminated against for simply being trans. For example, the National Center for Transgender Equality and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force’s Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the National Transgender Discrimination Survey, found that trans people — especially trans people of color — are disproportionately harassed by police and experience high rates of unequal treatment and harassment interacting with government agencies/officials, judges or courts, and legal services clinics.

Experiences while in prison

Trans people outside of prison are less likely to have access to necessary health care and services, and more likely to have negative interactions with police and experience unemployment. The trans respondents to the Survey of Prison Inmates suggest these experiences happen behind bars, too.

Substance use treatment. Previous studies of incarcerated trans people have found that trans people were frequently denied routine healthcare in prison. Data from the Survey of Prison Inmates suggests this may also be true of drug treatment. While there was no direct question about a substance use disorder diagnosis in the survey, a possible proxy measure is whether someone had ever received drug treatment in their lifetime.3 Of the trans people surveyed, about one-third (9) reported ever receiving such treatment. But of those individuals, only 2 had received treatment since admission to prison.

Discipline. Many of the trans people surveyed had received a rule violation in the previous 12 months (12), and half of those individuals (6) had received multiple rule violations over the same time period.4 Of those who reported receiving disciplinary action, five reported being confined to their cell, and three were sent to solitary confinement.

Unfortunately, the survey does not ask the important questions about being violated or harassed in prisons. This is of particular concern for trans incarcerated people, given that 35% percent of previously incarcerated trans people surveyed by the National Center for Transgender Equality reported harassment by other incarcerated people and 37% reported being harassed by correctional officers or staff.

Work assignments. Unemployment outside of prison among trans people is a serious concern. Given the reality that trans people are frequently discriminated against by employers, it’s important that they have equal access to employment opportunities when they are incarcerated. At the time of the survey, 18 trans respondents had work assignments. Three trans people surveyed reported that they worked in goods production/correctional industries which tend to pay more than jobs supporting the prison itself (though all prison wages are exceptionally low). Other common jobs for trans people in prisons were hospital/medical duties, working in libraries, barber and beauty shops, and food service, which may be preferred jobs in prisons because of their relevance to post-release job prospects.

Programming. Nearly half of the trans survey respondents reported participating in job training or educational programming opportunities since admission. Given that trans people are often excluded from or pushed out of educational and job opportunities before incarceration, they may be trying to make up for lost opportunities while confined. Incarceration shouldn’t be trans people’s only opportunity to access job training and education, though; they would be better served by having more support at earlier intervention points, and through the rest of their lives.

 

Transgender people in prisons have multiple, intersecting marginalized identities that make them more vulnerable to traumatic experiences throughout their lives. Although this survey included only 29 trans people, it provides some valuable insights about their needs and will hopefully be the foundation of more in-depth research by government agencies, scholars, and advocacy groups. But the existing research makes it clear that there is an urgent need for trans people to be provided with more support during incarceration, more support after incarceration, and more help avoiding contact with the criminal legal system in the first place.

 

Footnotes

  1. The 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey report provides a breadth of information about trans people’s life experiences, including a section that is particularly useful for understanding the prevalence of assaults and access to hormone therapy for people incarcerated in jails, prisons, and juvenile facilities, which is not available in any Bureau of Justice dataset. We hope this analysis of the Survey of Prison Inmates’ 2016 data provides additional context about the experiences of trans people incarcerated in state prisons specifically.  ↩

  2. Unemployment rates consistently decrease as educational attainment increases, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.  ↩

  3. Of course, past treatment is not evidence of an ongoing or current disorder, but this is the closest measure available with the Survey of Prison Inmates data we analyzed.  ↩

  4. In our analysis, we did not analyze types of rule violations by gender, but people could be “written up” for everything from minor offenses such as failing to follow sanitary regulations, to major offenses like work slowdowns. Of note, the individuals reporting a rule violation in the past 12 months were limited to respondents who had been in prison for at least 1 year and had reported at least one rule violation since admission (instead of the sample of 29 used throughout this briefing, the number of respondents to this survey question was limited to 16 trans people).  ↩


New data supports what advocates have been saying all along: there’s no need to detain so many people pretrial.

by Emily Widra, March 28, 2022

What prompted Harris County’s pretrial reform efforts?

How a federal court ruling lead to significant pretrial reform.

In 2017, a federal court found that the money bail system in Harris County was likely unconstitutional and ordered that misdemeanor defendants unable to pay bail be released on unsecured bonds (as opposed to money bonds). Previously, Harris County, as well as Dallas and Galveston counties, relied on “fixed” bail schedules, which set bails at predetermined amounts and fail to consider an individual’s ability to pay. Because of this, in Harris County almost 60% of people arrested for misdemeanors (lower-level charges) in 2015 were jailed pretrial, while limited data from other states shows that 22-48% of misdemeanor defendants are detained pretrial. Moreover, prior to the federal court ruling, people arrested for misdemeanors in Harris County had no defense attorney present at bail hearings, a procedural injustice that contributed to the excessive pretrial detention in the county.

Because of the federal court’s decisions, in November 2019, Harris County courts agreed to make major reforms to the county’s bail system, to be monitored by an independent, court-appointed team. The monitoring team is composed of legal scholars and researchers who submit reports to the federal court every six months.

New data is out that supports bail reform efforts to end reliance on cash bail, minimize the number of people charged with misdemeanors and detained pretrial, and improve misdemeanor bail hearings. The recently published findings come from researchers charged with monitoring misdemeanor pretrial reform as it is implemented in Harris County (Houston), Texas.

In the most recent report on Harris County’s pretrial reform, the monitoring team reviewed the results of the changes implemented so far, and generally found that the reforms are successfully addressing some of the most pressing issues with misdemeanor pretrial detention. We highlight some of the most significant results they report about Harris County’s misdemeanor bail reform so far:

”bar This graph is based on data from the Monitoring Pretrial Reform in Harris County, Fourth Report of the Court-Appointed Monitor on March 3, 2022.

Fewer people charged with misdemeanors and detained pretrial

Most people in city and county jails across the country are detained pretrial, meaning they are legally innocent and have not been convicted of the crime they are held for: too often, they are jailed because they cannot afford the cash bail set by the court. In Harris County, the percent of misdemeanor defendants detained pretrial dropped from 47% in 2015 to 22% in 2021. Unfortunately, a number of people are still detained despite the Consent Decree and subsequent reforms, for felony cases or because of “holds” for other agencies such as probation, parole, or immigration. (See report, Figure 12, p. 37)

Fewer misdemeanor convictions

Pretrial detention increases the odds of misdemeanor conviction, largely because detention pressures people to take plea deals when otherwise their case would likely be dismissed or they would be acquitted. By reducing the pretrial detention rate, the percentage of misdemeanor cases resulting in conviction dropped 54% from 2015 to 2020 in Harris County. Conversely, the percentage of misdemeanor cases resulting in dismissal or acquittal increased from 31% to 68% between 2015 and 2020. (See report, Figure 16, p. 43)

”bar

Shorter periods of being locked in jails

Because pretrial detention can have disastrous consequences for employment, housing security, and families, reducing the amount of time defendants spend behind bars is crucial. From 2015 to 2021, the percent of misdemeanor defendants detained pretrial in Harris County for 2-7 days dropped 14% and those detained for more than 7 days dropped 12%. Shorter stays became more common, with the share of defendants released within 2 days increasing by 27%. (See report, Table 3, p. 35)

Fewer “failures to appear” and no increase in pretrial arrests for new offenses

Two of the most commonly cited goals of pretrial detention and cash bail are to guarantee court appearances and reduce the likelihood of re-arrest before trial. But in Harris County, reducing the number of people detained pretrial actually decreased the rate at which people either missed their court date or had their bond revoked for some other reason (such as re-arrest) by 5%. Additionally, the share of misdemeanor arrestees with a new case filed within 90 days, 180 days, and 365 days remained unchanged following the reforms, suggesting that pretrial detention does not increase court appearances or reduce the chances of pretrial re-arrest. (See report, Table 6, p. 46 & Figure 14, p. 40)

Millions of dollars saved by the county and defendants

Conservative financial estimates suggest that Harris County saved $6.6 million per year from these changes and that individuals arrested for misdemeanors saved $314 million as a group over the past seven years. (See report, p. 51)

No increase in racial disparities

Unlike some other pretrial reform efforts, there is no evidence that racial disparities widened following the Harris County bail reforms. From 2015 to 2021, 58-59% of misdemeanor defendants in Harris County were Black. The reforms have not yet reduced disparities, either: The share of Black people arrested for misdemeanors in Harris County is still substantially higher than for misdemeanor arrests nationally (26%) and significantly higher than the share of Black residents of Harris County (20%). (See report, Figure 4, p. 26)

 

These new findings clearly support the bail reform efforts taken so far in Harris County, and should serve to embolden policymakers to take similar action in their own jurisdictions. Unfortunately, Texas officials themselves seem to be ignoring the evidence that bail reform can safely reduce unnecessary jailing. Just before these findings were published, Texas Governor Abbott signed Senate Bill 6 into law, eliminating the possibility for release on personal bond for “violent” crimes (or for those who are charged with any felony, misdemeanor assault, deadly conduct, or gun charges while out on bail for a “violent” offense).1

While the Harris County reforms focused on misdemeanors and this new law is concerned with felonies, previous research offers a plethora of evidence supporting bail reform at both the misdemeanor and felony levels. In fact, 2017 research from Harris County suggests that pretrial detention can actually increase the odds of future offending and reviews of pretrial reform across the country reveal that increased pretrial release does not result in increased crime. On an individual level, pretrial detention often has detrimental effects on an individual’s employment, housing, financial stability, and family wellbeing. The evidence from Harris County and from other states that have implemented more robust pretrial reforms — like Kentucky and New Jersey — demonstrates that these reforms are common-sense changes that save money, protect individuals and families, and uphold justice and community safety alike.

 
 

Footnotes

  1. Senate Bill 6 — or “the Damon Allen Act” — is named after a state trooper who was killed during a 2017 traffic stop. The suspect in his death was out on a $15,500 bond (meaning he paid the amount of cash bail set by the court), and therefore the reactionary efforts of this bill would not have changed the conditions of his release back in 2017. (And, it’s important to note, his release was prior to the 2017 lawsuit that resulted in the Harris County misdemeanor bail reforms discussed above.)  ↩

Updated March 29, 2022 with a graphic that more clearly shows the changes in outcomes for misdemeanor defendants, and with text changes that reflect the relative (percent) change in rates rather than the net change in rates for these outcomes.


Reductions in prison and jail populations were due to COVID-related slowdowns in the gears of the criminal legal system. Without intentional action, these reductions will be erased.

by Wendy Sawyer, March 24, 2022

Sections
Crime and arrests
Jail bookings & pretrial detention
Court slowdowns
Prison admissions
Keeping admssions low

Last week, we released the latest edition of our Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie report, in which we showed about 1.9 million people locked up by various U.S. systems of confinement, according to the most recent data available. Out of context, that number would be cause for celebration among those of us fighting to end mass incarceration: it’s almost 400,000 fewer people than were locked up before the pandemic. Unfortunately, this reduction in the incarcerated population is unlikely to last very long without more lasting policy change. In fact, fear-mongering about upticks in certain specific crimes may make this work even harder and lead to policy changes that make mass incarceration even more intractable.

It’s important, therefore, to understand what changes — intentional or not — led to the prison and jail population drops in 2020 and 2021. This briefing offers the context needed to temper expectations about sustaining those population drops and to maintain focus on the policy changes needed to permanently reduce the use of confinement. Without those needed changes, we can expect prison and jail populations to return to pre-pandemic “normal” (extreme by any other measure) as the criminal legal system returns to “business as usual.”

Chart showing the pandemic caused a reduction in arrests and prison admissions, and slowed down courts. The reduction in prison admissions, which explains most of the drop in incarceration in the early pandemic, was the effect of temporary changes in arrest and jail practices, court slowdowns, and the refusal of some prisons to accept transfers from jails. However, the data do not allow us to distinguish how much of the drop in admissions was due to a given type of change, such as transfer refusals versus slowdowns.

The changes that have had the most impact on incarceration since the start of the pandemic include:

  • 24% fewer arrests in 2020 compared to 2019, largely due to changes in everyday behaviors under widespread “stay at home orders,” as well as short-term guidance issued by some police departments to limit unnecessary contact and jail bookings;
  • 21% fewer criminal cases filed in state courts in 2020 compared to 2019 — the result of fewer arrests and changes in some prosecutorial practices;
  • 36% fewer criminal cases resolved in state courts from 2019 to 2020, attributable to court closures, operational changes, and delays in case processing;
  • A 17 percentage point net drop in criminal case clearance rates in state courts, indicating a growing backlog of pending cases;
  • 40% fewer admissions to state and federal prisons in 2020 compared to 2019, largely the result of court slowdowns but also partly due to the refusal of some prisons to accept transfers from local jails to prevent the spread of the virus.
Chart showing states released fewer people during 2020 than in 2019

Critically, the one thing that we and other advocates demanded from the very start of the pandemic – intentional, large-scale releases to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in the tight quarters of prisons and jails – did not happen. In the first year of the pandemic, prisons actually released 10% fewer people than they did the year before, and among the twelve states that regularly publish more recent data, that trend held throughout 2021 as well. Only three states (New Jersey, California, and North Carolina) released a significant number of incarcerated people from prisons. Parole boards also approved fewer releases in the first year of the pandemic than the year before.

 

Changes in crime and arrests

Two major factors contributed to the 24% drop in arrests in 2020: widespread changes in behavior and more limited changes in police practices. The shift away from in-person activities towards remote work, learning, commerce, and social contact represented a major change in our usual behaviors. This explains some changes in crime trends: for example, with more people home during work hours and on weekends, there were fewer low-risk targets for home break-ins. And in 2020, there were 18% fewer home burglaries reported than in 2019, and consequently 13% fewer arrests for burglary. With fewer people out, there were also fewer opportunities for thefts that require close contact: reports of pickpocketing dropped 37% and purse-snatching 25%, and arrests for these types of crimes (larceny/theft) dropped 23%. The 24% drop in arrests for driving under the influence (DUI) also makes sense in this context: there were fewer people on the roads, and for a long time, few bars or restaurants open for people to consume alcohol.

Chart showing arrests fell by 24% from 2019 to 2020.

Policing changed too, to a lesser degree. Police officers got sick, reducing their capacity to arrest, and some officials directed police to avoid unnecessary contact with the public and to issue more citations in lieu of arrest. This likely explains the dramatic reductions in arrests for “nuisance” crimes like vagrancy and drunkenness.

Some of these changes were extremely short-lived: Philadelphia police suspended “non-violent” arrests in mid-March 2020, but just two weeks later, the police force announced it would resume arrests for property crimes, effectively reversing the earlier policy. Police in Maui, Hawai’i set up a call center early in the pandemic to handle calls that didn’t require in-person responses; it was shut down within just three months, when the Police Chief declared “things are settling down.”

Given that almost all of these changes were in direct response to the pandemic, as opposed to long-term policy changes, we should anticipate a return to pre-pandemic arrest rates as work, school, business, and social life return to “normal.”

 

Jail bookings and pretrial detention decisions

Jail admissions generally mirror arrest trends, so fewer arrests mean fewer people booked into jail. The drop in arrests in 2020 therefore accounts for most of the 16% drop in jail admissions over the course of the year. But there were also some notable, temporary, pandemic-response policies that contributed to the reduced jail populations we saw in 2020, namely:

  • The promises of many prosecutors to decline to prosecute certain low-level offenses or to dismiss pending charges against people arrested for such offenses,
  • The suspension of arrests for non-criminal (or “technical”) violations of probation and parole,
  • Temporary changes in probation and parole conditions that made it easier for people under community supervision to comply, such as videoconferencing instead of face-to-face check-ins and the waiving of monthly fees, and
  • The temporary suspension of arrests on outstanding “bench warrants” for things like missed court dates.

Some courts and prosecutors also made impactful, though temporary, changes to pretrial processes. On any given day, at least two-thirds of the nation’s jails are filled with people who have not been convicted and are legally innocent, many because they cannot afford money bail. But early in the pandemic, we saw changes like the “$0 bail” emergency rule ordered for California’s courts, which eliminated unaffordable bail as a barrier to pretrial release for people accused of misdemeanors and lower-level felonies. In another example, the State’s Attorney in Vermont’s largest county directed her office to stop requesting bail for defendants facing low-level charges.

Together, these changes reduced the use of jails for things other than serious public safety concerns. Most of these temporary policies have long since expired, so, except for those places that have enacted policies to permanently reduce incarceration for these non-dangerous and/or non-criminal violations, we should expect to see more people jailed for these reasons again as the pandemic wanes.

 

Court slowdowns

Most courts had to dramatically change their operations during the pandemic in ways that led to long delays in case processing. According to the National Center for State Courts, the most common court responses to the pandemic included restricting or ending jury trials, suspending in-person proceedings, restricting entry to courthouses, extended filing deadlines, and encouraging video conferences in place of hearings.

Chart showing fewer court cases were started, closed, or cleared in 2020 than in 2019.

In 2020, 21% fewer criminal cases were filed in state courts than in 2019, which in turn meant fewer people were convicted and sentenced to jail or prison. The most recent data available indicates that the number of criminal case filings were still much lower than pre-pandemic levels as of June 2021. Some of this drop in new cases is explained by changing crime and arrest trends, but prosecutorial decisions also played a key role. For example, the Maricopa County (Arizona) Attorney’s Office began delaying the filing of – but not dismissing – “thousands of charges” in an effort to keep down the number of people in courtrooms and jails (and potentially to avoid problems complying with speedy trial laws). And Seattle’s District Attorney decided early on to briefly stop filing charges except for “priority in-custody violent crimes.”

But the changes in court operations have made an even bigger dent in case dispositions than case filings: in 2020, state courts closed 36% fewer criminal cases than in 2019. Unable to keep pace with incoming cases, the clearance rate for criminal cases across over 30 state court systems dropped from 105% in 2019 (when courts were able to close more cases annually than were added to the docket) to 88% in 2020. Some of this slowdown, too, was the result of attorneys requesting postponements; some was simply due to court closures.

Chart showing active pending classes have grown exponentially since early in the pandemic.

Pandemic caseload data from the Court Statistics Project show that criminal court slowdowns were at their worst between July 2020 and January 2021, but even with fewer new cases coming in, “pending” cases have piled up and will take time to clear. As they do, and as arrests and prosecution return to pre-pandemic norms, we can expect the rate of people convicted and sentenced to incarceration to climb back up.

 

Prison admissions

The cumulative effect of fewer arrests, temporary changes in probation and parole practices, and pandemic-related delays in trials and sentencing was a dramatic 40% reduction in the number of people who entered prisons in 2020. The number of new court commitments (that is, people admitted to prison to serve a new sentence) dropped almost 43% from 2019 to 2020. And, for the same reasons jail admissions fell for non-criminal violations of probation and parole, the number of people admitted to prisons for these violations fell 35%. The massive decrease in admissions was driven by steep drops in large states like California (down 66%), Florida (down 53%), and New York (down 60%).

Some of the change in admissions to prison, however, was simply because people were left in jails longer before being transferred to prisons. In an effort to prevent the spread of COVID-19 between facilities (a very valid concern), some state prison systems, such as Illinois’, refused to admit people held in local jails who were sentenced to prison. While this may have helped slow the spread into prisons, staff were still bringing the virus into facilities from their home communities. Meanwhile, these delays left thousands of people stuck in local jails, which have fewer programs and far more population turnover than prisons – a miserable situation at any time, but particularly during a pandemic.

Again, because the changes that resulted in fewer admissions in 2020 were temporary responses to the pandemic, we should expect prison populations to rebound to pre-pandemic levels as courts catch up with their backlog of pending cases and probation and parole agencies return to more stringent conditions and harsher punishments for non-criminal violations.

 

Prison and jail admissions are at historic lows. We can keep it that way.

The changes to the criminal legal system during the pandemic were, for the most part, temporary responses to the immediate public health emergency, not deliberate policy choices to reduce incarcerated populations over the long term. There is little reason to think that incarceration rates will remain at their pandemic-era lows without more intentional changes, particularly since jail and prison populations have already started to rebound. Furthermore, the piecemeal actions that federal, state, and local authorities did take were not nearly enough to protect people in prisons and jails, nor the communities that surround them. To date, almost 600,000 incarcerated people have been infected and more than 3,000 have died behind bars because of COVID-19. And of course, the pandemic isn’t over; still, authorities continue to ignore public health guidance that specifically calls for decarceration.

The fact that many early-pandemic policy changes were so short-lived is particularly frustrating since we know they helped rapidly reduce populations without compromising public safety. Data from the National Crime Victimization Survey show that the number of violent crimes (excluding homicide, which the survey does not cover) fell from about 2 million in 2019 to 1.6 million in 2020; accordingly, the rate of violent victimization fell by 22%. The household property crime victimization rate fell by about 7%. And, as discussed above, arrests and crimes reported by police fell, too.

Government authorities’ willful disregard of the evidence that further, sustained policy changes are both urgently needed and safe is part of a larger problem, of course. The perception (not a reality) that criminal justice reforms have led to upticks in crime over the past few years has fueled pushback against smart policy changes. That perception is powerful, and history shows that reactionary policies can follow: In the 1980s and 1990s, the last time prison and jail populations were as low as they were in 2020, the knee-jerk reaction to (much bigger) increases in crime was to lock more people up, and for longer. Particularly in the context of the ongoing pandemic, we can’t afford to let that happen again.


We worked with the National Consumer Law Center to explain how, at every state of incarceration, governments and private corporations are draining money from those who can least afford it.

by Mike Wessler, March 23, 2022

the logo for Inquest

In a new piece in Inquest, our general counsel Stephen Raher and Ariel Nelson of the National Consumer Law Center expose the cycle of exploitation that saps money from incarcerated people and their loved ones. The piece provides a big-picture overview of how government agencies and private corporations are profiting off of this system. It explains there are three stages in the cycle:

  1. First, companies and governments take a cut of money coming into prisons. Even in prison, a person needs money to survive, and because prison wages are so low, many incarcerated people rely on money transfers from loved ones to survive. At a time when people in the free world can instantly send money through their smartphones for free, prison money transfers still come with a whopping 20% average fee.
  2. Next, while in prison, incarcerated people are subjected to outlandish rates and prices for essentials — like communications services, food, and hygiene products — and burdened with mandatory fees for things like medical care and the general cost of confinement.
  3. Finally, when a person is released, they often receive a release card, a prepaid debit card that contains money they had when entering prison, money they earned while locked up, and money they had in their trust account. These cards are rife with fees — many of them unavoidable — that quickly drain the money on the card and line the pockets of the companies that administer these programs.

People increasingly recognize this cycle of exploitation is morally problematic and makes poverty — one of the main drivers of criminalized behavior — worse. That’s why some government agencies are increasingly cracking down on this behavior, and through our research and advocacy, we’re pressuring more states to join them.

We encourage you to check out the piece to understand better how the cycle of exploitation works. If you’re looking for more details and state-specific data, check out our work exposing exploitation in the criminal legal system.


A new report from the Correctional Association of New York reveals why some people in prison are reluctant to get the COVID-19 vaccine and a lot of it has to do with distrust in the correctional system.

by Emily Widra, March 9, 2022

Over 3,000 incarcerated and detained people in the United States have died of COVID-19 in the past two years, with over 588,000 cumulative cases behind bars. With little sign of COVID-19 quietly fading away, public health officials have been clear, consistent, and accurate that vaccinations are our strongest defense against existing and future variants of COVID-19. But despite widespread vaccine availability across the country, many people continue to be hesitant about the COVID-19 vaccination.1

While the vaccine refusal rates are not generally worse in prisons than in the general population, vaccination is even more critical in prisons. Incarcerated people can’t employ other strategies to avoid getting COVID-19, they have higher rates of medical conditions that make them more vulnerable to severe illness and death, and if they do fall ill, they don’t have the same access to prompt, effective medical care as people outside of prison do. Behind bars, the risks of non-vaccination can be even more deadly, with a COVID-19 death rate of more than double that of the general U.S. population.2

report cover for CANY vaccine hesitancy report in Jan 2022

An insightful new report from the Correctional Association of New York offers the only survey data we know of that explains why incarcerated people are hesitant to accept the COVID-19 vaccination. 3 A report focusing on New York is particularly valuable nationally because New York State was one of the least successful states (by our data 4) at vaccinating incarcerated people.5 The report finds that vaccine hesitancy in prison is rooted in general distrust and suspicion of healthcare in prison, and that the solutions to overcome vaccine hesitancy behind bars are more complicated than in non-carceral settings.

Researchers have determined that the best practice for addressing vaccine hesitancy – in general and in the context of COVID-19 – is to promote transparency, equity, and trust between individuals, communities, and healthcare providers.6 In addition, we know that community engagement,7 messaging and education,8 and timely and accurate information about vaccines are critical for responses to vaccine hesitancy.

The reality is that the prison context inherently undermines almost all of the best practices for responding to vaccine hesitancy.

 

The erosion of trust in prison healthcare undermines vaccination efforts

The major finding of the Correctional Association report is that the primary reason people behind bars are hesitant to get the vaccine is a lack of trust in the prison medical system.
Before COVID-19, incarcerated people were suspicious and critical of prison healthcare: they reported poor quality of care, difficulty accessing medical care, and a distrust of prison medical care. Some incarcerated people in New York cited the Tuskegee syphilis experiment and the water crisis in Flint, Michigan as reasons to be suspicious of state public health initiatives, stating, “My greatest fear is to be a lab rat for the state” and “Communities of color have always been experimented on; why are state officials going to stop now?”

But the distrust is particularly poignant in the context of COVID-19 vaccinations. A slight majority of incarcerated people surveyed by the Correctional Association reported that they generally “trust vaccines” (52%). A similar number (49%) of respondents reported that they generally trust doctors and healthcare providers to make medically correct judgements, but only 9% of respondents trust doctors or healthcare providers in a prison to make medically correct judgments.

two charts showing that survey respondents are less likely to trust healthcare providers in prison than in general Figure 1: Responses regarding trust of healthcare providers to the Correctional Association of New York survey of incarcerated people in New York state. This graph, published by the Correctional Association in their annual report, shows that incarcerated people are much more likely to distrust prison healthcare providers than non-prison-affiliated healthcare providers.

Given that general distrust of prison medical providers, it’s unsurprising that a significant portion of survey respondents were less likely to accept the COVID-19 vaccination if offered by the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision’s (DOCCS) medical staff.

chart showing that 42.7% of respondents were less likely to get the COVID-19 vaccine if administered by prison staff Figure 2: Responses regarding likelihood of accepting the COVID-19 vaccine if administered by correctional staff and correctional health care providers to the Correctional Association of New York survey of incarcerated people in New York state. This graph, published by the Correctional Association in their annual report, shows that 42.7% of respondents are less likely to accept the vaccine if it is administered by correctional staff, again emphasizing the inherent lack of trust between incarcerated individuals and the correctional healthcare system.

 

“What works” to overcome vaccine hesitancy hasn’t worked in prisons

Public health experts have established best practices for addressing vaccine hesitancy, but the persistence of this distrust among incarcerated people underscores how the prison setting itself undermines these practices:

  • Trusted communicators are crucial to expanding vaccine acceptance. Most recommendations for addressing vaccine hesitancy emphasize the need for “trusted communicators,” but with limited visitation and suspended programming and volunteers, who are the trusted communicators in prisons? The reality is that most information about the vaccines in prisons comes from prison administrators and correctional staff. In May 2021, a month after vaccines were available to people in congregate living situations (like prisons), John J. Lennon (incarcerated in New York) recommended in a New York Times op-ed that the DOCCS “tap influential prisoners to disseminate accurate vaccine information” and even suggested utilizing the preexisting inmate liaison committees established after the Attica uprising. According to the recent Correctional Association report, the New York DOCCS instead “developed a video featuring Tyler Perry and incarcerated people attesting to the benefits of the vaccine.” The reality is that trust, transparency, and equity have long been eroded by the criminal legal and prison systems, which this video had little hope of repairing.
  • Community engagement is often limited in prisons, where interactions between incarcerated people are regularly restricted. During COVID-19, community engagement behind bars all but disappeared. Programming – including education courses, work-release, treatment programs, and group activities – were suspended in every state prison system (as far as we’ve been able to tell) at some point during COVID-19. Many prisons stopped programming and in-person visits entirely for the better part of the past two years. Additionally, incarcerated people have experienced unnecessary use of solitary confinement during the pandemic. Correctional institutions in the United States have long been distanced from “mainstream” society and community, and in many ways, the pandemic has only furthered that isolation. So while having community members and volunteers who aren’t part of the prison system come in to informally discuss vaccination concerns might have helped improve vaccine acceptance, incarcerated people saw even fewer people from the outside during the pandemic.
  • Disseminating timely and accurate information has proven difficult in correctional facilities. Contact with those outside prison walls has been limited throughout the pandemic, with suspended or limited visitation, increasing restrictions on mail, expensive phone calls, and interrupted programming. But relying on information from only within the prison comes with a high cost for vaccine acceptance: misinformation and distrust of the vaccine can run rampant and unchecked. John J. Lennon reported for the New York Times that corrections officers where he is incarcerated told him that the vaccine was “not tested enough” and that COVID-19 was just “the flu.” A sergeant in the Florida Department of Corrections told The Marshall Project, “If I’m wearing a mask, gloves, washing my hands and being careful — I’d still feel better working like that than putting the vaccine in my body.” Other correctional officials in Florida told The Marshall Project that some of their colleagues believe the vaccine could give them the virus or that the vaccine contains some kind of tracking device.9

The responses to the Correctional Association survey point to a lack of trust in prison medical care providers based on the quality and inaccessibility of care, limited access to information about their healthcare, and the tension between healthcare professionals meeting their duty to their patients while enforcing and complying with directives of the prison administration (sometimes referred to as “dual loyalty“). The DOCCS’ mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent traumatic experiences during COVID-19 in prison, only served to erode incarcerated people’s trust further.

In many ways, the pandemic has served to highlight just how opaque the prison healthcare system is and just how wary incarcerated people are of prison medical care. Moving forward, prison systems must do better, not only by providing better, more accessible, more transparent health care, but also by recognizing their inherent limits when it comes to responding to public health concerns, and adopting better strategies.

 

Specifically, when faced with the current and future health emergencies, prison systems should:

  1. Release more people from prisons. Nationwide, states and the federal government actually released 10% fewer people from prison in 2020 than in 2019, despite the consensus among public health officials and advocates that decarceration is crucial to protecting public health and limiting the spread of COVID-19. To reverse this trend, departments of corrections, state governments, and courts need to work together to release people from prison using any tools they have at their disposal, including large-scale releases like we saw in New Jersey, California, and North Carolina. The Correctional Association report recommends increasing the use of pretrial release, alternative sentencing, early release, medical parole, parole board release, and commutation to rapidly reduce prison populations.
  2. Address issues of transparency and equity in correctional health care. To address these issues in the context of COVID-19, the Correctional Association report recommends expanding the provision of adequate and timely information about COVID-19 and the vaccine, and alleviating gaps in the quality of medical services by expanding preventative care (routine screenings, education, and outreach). To improve general correctional healthcare, the Correctional Association report recommends that the state designate an independent correctional ombuds to investigate and resolve complaints related to incarcerated peoples’ health, safety, welfare, and rights, as well shift oversight of correctional healthcare to the state department of health.
  3. Ensure that corrections officials are dedicated to reducing our reliance on incarceration and improving the health and welfare of those under their care. Corrections officials and decision makers need to take COVID-19 – and the subsequent deaths of over 3,000 incarcerated people – seriously. Incarcerated people’s connection to up-to-date news is tenuous at best, and during COVID-19 (with limited visits and changes in phone call and mail policies), they’ve been even more reliant on information directly from corrections departments. Mixed messages about the realities of COVID-19 from corrections departments (we’ve heard at least one report of a PA system announcement in a Pennsylvania prison facility stating that the pandemic is “over”) and corrections officers’ own vaccine hesitancy and misinformation leave incarcerated people in the dark to the detriment of everyone.

While COVID-19 vaccinations and booster doses are some of our strongest defenses in the face of the continued pandemic and new variants, it’s increasingly clear that prison systems need to prioritize decarceration. No amount of public health education and vaccine messaging will, on their own, dismantle decades of distrust and suspicion of prison health care. Prisons are no place for a public health crisis and government officials should be prioritizing releases and decarceration as both a first response and an ongoing response to emergencies like COVID-19.

 
 
 
 

Footnotes

  1. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines “vaccine hesitancy” as a “delay in acceptance or refusal of vaccines despite availability of vaccine service” and in 2019 – before COVID-19 – vaccine hesitancy was one of the ten greatest risks to global health.  ↩

  2. The COVID-19 death rate in prisons at the end of April 2021 stood at a staggering 200 deaths per 100,000 incarcerated people, much higher than the death rate among the general U.S. population of 81 deaths per 100,000 residents. These rates, calculated by the UCLA Law COVID Behind Bars Data Project, were adjusted to account for differences in age and sex between the prison population and the general U.S. population. For more details about how these rates were calculated, see “COVID-19 Incidence and Mortality in Federal and State Prisons Compared With the US Population, April 5, 2020, to April 3, 2021” published in the Journal of the American Medical Association.  ↩

  3. Although it is outside the scope of the Correctional Association report and this briefing, it is important to mention that there are still instances of incarcerated and detained people requesting COVID-19 vaccines and/or boosters and being denied. For example, a 2022 lawsuit filed by the ACLU on behalf of people detained in ICE facilities reported that detainees had been repeatedly denied booster doses despite obvious medical vulnerabilities.  ↩

  4. Comparative data on vaccination in prisons is very hard to come by as many states do not publish the data, do not publish it frequently, or calculate it differently. But as of our December 2021 survey, New York had one of the lowest rates – 52% as of December 5, 2021 – and almost all of the states with lower rates of vaccination had much older data, dating as far back as June 2021 when the vaccine itself was in short supply. (The Correctional Association reports a figure of 48.3% as of September 2021, which they presumably received directly from the state prison system.)  ↩

  5. New York’s vaccination plan implied that incarcerated people would be eligible early, with “those living in other congregate settings.” However, as of early March 2021, vaccine eligibility had not yet been expanded to all incarcerated people. Availability to people younger than 65 in prison was made possible by a late March 2021 New York State Supreme Court ruling, after which the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision began the vaccine rollout to the entire incarcerated adult population. The ruling noted that incarcerated people had been arbitrarily and unfairly excluded from the vaccine rollout plan: state officials “irrationally distinguished between incarcerated people and people living in every other type of adult congregate facility, at great risk to incarcerated people’s lives during this pandemic.”  ↩

  6. “Public Trust and Willingness to Vaccinate Against COVID-19 in the US From October 14, 2020, to March 29, 2021,” Journal of the American Medical Association (2021); “Strategies to Address COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy and Mitigate Health Disparities in Minority Populations,” Frontiers in Public Health, (2021); “Psychological characteristics associated with COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy and resistance in Ireland and the United Kingdom,” Nature Communications (2021); “Understanding COVID-19 misinformation and vaccine hesitancy in context: Findings from a qualitative study involving citizens in Bradford, UK,” Health Expectations (2021); “Racial differences in institutional trust and COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy and refusal,” BMC Public Health (2021); “Influences on Attitudes Regarding Potential COVID-19 Vaccination in the United States,” Vaccines (2020).  ↩

  7. “Strategies to Address COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy and Mitigate Health Disparities in Minority Populations,” Frontiers in Public Health (2021); “Building Vaccine Confidence Through Community Engagement,” American Psychological Association (2020); “The COVID-19 vaccines rush: participatory community engagement matters more than ever,” The Lancet (2021); “Strategies for public engagement to combat mistrust and build COVID-19 vaccine confidence,” The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2021).  ↩

  8. “Impact of an Education Intervention on COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy in a Military Base Population,” Military Medicine (2021); “These are the pro-vaccine messages people want to hear” The Washington Post (2021); “Effects of different types of written vaccination information on COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy in the UK,” The Lancet Public Health (2021).  ↩

  9. COVID-19 is not the same as the seasonal flu, the COVID-19 vaccines and boosters do not give you COVID-19, and the vaccines do not contain any tracking devices.  ↩


In the toolkit, we share tips and lessons we’ve learned over two decades of using data, visuals, and narratives to expose the harms of mass incarceration.

by Mike Wessler, March 2, 2022

Today, we’re launching our new Advocacy Toolkit, a collection of guides and training materials that advocates can use to strengthen their campaigns to end mass incarceration. The toolkit builds on lessons we’ve learned from our two decades of work to improve our criminal legal system. It provides skills-based guides on accessing public records, securing and organizing data, crafting persuasive narratives, and creating impactful visuals. It also includes issue-based guides on protecting in-person visits in prisons and jails, opposing jail expansion, and ending prison gerrymandering. We plan to add additional resources in the future.

Our new advocacy department created this toolkit as part of our expanded effort to support the people and groups on the ground doing the hard work to end mass incarceration.

While most advocacy departments organize campaigns, mobilize volunteers, and pressure decision-makers for change, ours is a bit different. We’re not looking to replicate the amazing work that thousands of people and hundreds of organizations are already doing to reform the criminal legal system. Instead, as a research organization known for using data visualizations and easy-to-understand narratives, our advocacy work aims to help these organizations leverage our expertise to strengthen their campaigns. That’s why our advocacy department will focus on:

  • connecting state and local movement partners and decision-makers to data that can fuel their campaigns for criminal justice reform;
  • identifying and filling gaps where new research would support reform efforts;
  • producing training materials, like the Advocacy Toolkit, for use by criminal justice reform advocates; and
  • providing technical assistance, including identifying reform opportunities (such as our annual list of winnable state criminal justice reforms), giving messaging support, offering expert review of documents and legislation, and connecting partners working in similar spaces.

We hope these new resources will help to strengthen the movement to end mass incarceration. If you use the Toolkit in your work, tell us about it. Let us know what worked, what didn’t, and what other resources we can provide. And, if you’re an organization seeking assistance from our new advocacy department, drop us a line to let us know how we can help.


While some prison systems and local jails have maintained historically low populations, others have returned to pre-pandemic levels, despite the ongoing dangers of COVID-19 and new, more transmissible variants.

by Emily Widra, February 10, 2022

The COVID-19 pandemic is far from over, particularly inside prisons and jails. The death rate from COVID-19 in prisons is more than double that of the general U.S. population.1 As cases and hospitalizations climb outside prison walls, there is no doubt that cases are spiking in jails and prisons across the country. In state and federal prisons, over 2,900 people have died of COVID-19, almost 476,000 people have been infected, and thousands of additional cases are linked to individual county jails. Even now, when more than 75% of people in the U.S. have received at least one dose of the vaccine, correctional staff are hesitant to get vaccinated or receive boosters, and prison systems are slow to roll out boosters to incarcerated people.2 As the more contagious Omicron variant ravages parts of the nation and renders hospitals completely overrun, nearly three quarters of prisons3 are experiencing COVID-19 outbreaks; public health officials continue to recommend reducing prison populations as a primary method of risk reduction. In fact, in October 2021, the American Public Health Association4 adopted a policy in support of decarceration as a public health matter and new research shows the detrimental effect of COVID-19 on all-cause mortality in state prisons. Despite the clear need for smaller confined populations, the data show that with just a few exceptions, state and local authorities are allowing their prison and jail populations to return to dangerous, pre-pandemic levels.

The federal Bureau of Prisons, state governments and departments of corrections, and local justice system officials have a responsibility to protect the health and lives of those who are incarcerated. After almost two years of outbreak after outbreak in prisons and jails, correctional authorities must be held accountable for their repeated failure to reduce populations enough to prevent the illness and death of those who are incarcerated and in surrounding communities.

Prisons

Even in states where prison populations have dropped, there are still too many people behind bars to accommodate social distancing, effective isolation and quarantine, and the increased health care needs of incarcerated people. For example, although California has reduced the state prison population by about 18% since the start of the pandemic, it has not been enough to prevent large COVID-19 outbreaks in the state’s prisons, and the prison system has witnessed a 300% increase in infections among incarcerated people over the past few weeks and a 212% increase in cases among staff. In fact, as of December 15th, 2021, California’s prisons were still holding more people than they were designed for, at 113% of their design capacity (and up from 103% in January 2021). Considering the continued overcrowding in the California prison system, it’s not surprising that the state is responsible for eight out of the ten largest COVID-19 prison clusters.

Map showing graphs for all 50 states prison population change from January 2020 to December 2021 Figure 1. Prison population data for 50 state prison systems as reported directly from the state Departments of Correction and the Marshall Project and federal data as published weekly by the federal Bureau of Prisons. For the available population data for these 50 states and the Bureau of Prisons, see Appendix A.

Many states’ prison populations are the lowest they’ve been in decades, but this is not because more people are being released from prisons; in fact, fewer people are. Data from 2020, recently released by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, shows that prisons nationwide released 10% fewer people in 2020 than in 2019. Instead, data suggest most of the population drops we’ve seen over the past 20 months are due to reduced prison admissions, not increasing releases. In the states for which we have recent data, both admissions and releases have decreased in recent years, making clear that prisons are not using all available tools at their disposal to stop the spread of the virus in their facilities. The significant drop in admissions to prisons was largely an unintended consequence of court delays and suspension of transfers from local jails early in the pandemic, rather than any dedicated decarceration efforts. Finding ways to continue reducing the number of people admitted to correctional facilities is critical to lowering the number of people behind bars, but to quickly decarcerate, states should release far more people, too.

Line graphs showing admissions and releases for twelve states from 2018 through 2021 Figure 2. These twelve states publish monthly release and admission data for 2018, 2019, 2020, and most of 2021. These data show us a pattern of responses to the COVID-19 pandemic: reducing prison admissions, while releasing fewer people from prison.

Despite evidence that large-scale releases — which have been used periodically in states across the U.S. — do not inherently endanger public safety, most states have elected to release people from prison on a mostly case-by-case basis, which an October 2020 report from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine charitably described as “procedurally slow and not well suited to crisis situations.” In short, this choice ignores the crisis of COVID-19.

line graph comparing change in prison population change in New Jersey to national average

Thankfully, some states have recognized the inefficiency of case-by-case releases and the necessity of larger-scale releases. For example, in New Jersey, Governor Phil Murphy signed bill S2519 in October 2020, which allowed for the early release of people with less than a year left on their sentences. A few weeks after the bill was signed, more than 2,000 people were released from New Jersey state prisons on November 4th, 2020.5 In February 2021, North Carolina Governor Roy Cooper announced a legal settlement had been reached to release 3,500 people in state custody (with 1,500 of those releases to take place within 90 days). The releases were the result of a NAACP lawsuit challenging prison conditions in North Carolina during COVID-19. The state said it would release people using discretionary sentence credits (similar to “good time credits”), home confinement, and post-release supervision. But these instances of larger-scale release efforts taking place in state prison systems are the exception, not the rule.

Jails

Jail populations, like prison populations, are lower now than they were pre-pandemic. Initially, many local officials — including sheriffs, prosecutors, and judges — responded quickly to COVID-19 and reduced their jail populations. In a national sample of 415 county jails of varying sizes, almost all (98%) decreased their populations from March to May of 2020, resulting in an average change of a 33% population decrease across all 415 jails at the start of COVID-19. These population reductions came as the result of various policy changes, including police issuing citations in lieu of arrests, prosecutors declining to charge people for “low-level offenses,” courts reducing cash bail amounts, and jail administrators releasing people detained pretrial or those serving short sentences for “nonviolent” offenses.

But those early-pandemic, common-sense policy changes didn’t last long. Between May 2020 and February 2021, the populations of 83% of the jails in our sample increased, reversing course from the earlier months of the pandemic. As of December 2021, 28% of the jails in our sample have higher populations now than they did in March 2020.6 Overall, the average population change across these 415 jails from March 2020 to December 2021 has diminished to only a 10% decrease, while the average population change from July 2021 to December 2021 has dropped to 0%, suggesting that the early reforms instituted to mitigate COVID-19 have largely been abandoned.

For example, by mid-April 2020, the Philadelphia city jail population reportedly dropped by more than 17% after city police suspended low-level arrests and judges released “certain nonviolent detainees” jailed for “low-level charges.” But just two weeks later — as the pandemic raged on — the Philadelphia police force announced that they would resume arrests for property crimes, effectively reversing the earlier reduction efforts. Similarly, on July 10th, 2020, the sheriff of Jefferson County (Birmingham), Alabama, announced that the jail would limit admissions to only “violent felons that cannot make bond.” That effort was quickly abandoned when the jail resumed normal admission operations just one week later. The increasing jail populations across the country suggest that after the first wave of responses to COVID-19, many local officials have allowed jail admissions to return to business as usual.

Line graph of population change from March 2020 to December 2021 across 415 county jails Figure 3. Jails across the country initially responded to COVID-19 by reducing the number of people detained, but that trend reversed direction in May 2020, only two months after the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic. Since May 2020, the data show a trend of jail populations slowly increasing. This graph contains aggregated data collected and provided by NYU’s Public Safety Lab and updates a graph in our October 2021 analysis. It includes all jails where the Lab was able to report data on March 10th and for at least 75% of the days in our research period, which ended December 31, 2021. (Data are not available for all facilities for all days, and the Lab interpolated missing data to fill those gaps.) This graph presents the data as 7-day rolling averages, which smooths out most of the variations caused by individual facilities not reporting population data on particular days. To see county level data for all 415 jails included in this analysis, see Appendix B.

In New York City, the jail population sharply declined after the pandemic was declared. Importantly, NYC jails – particularly Rikers Island – were some of the first jails in the country to witness a COVID-19 outbreak. And yet, across different demographics, NYC jail populations have slowly leveled out, suggesting that the policies responsible for the necessary decarceration are no longer in practice. In addition to suffering the effects of COVID-19, Rikers Island is also facing an unprecedented crisis following a history of over-incarceration and, according to a federal monitor, “decades of mismanagement.” At a time when jail populations should be at an all-time low, Rikers Island’s confined population surpassed the pre-COVID-19 population in July 2021. The population only dropped back down below the pre-pandemic level at the end of September 2021, when Gov. Hochul signed the Less is More Act, which reduced the number jailed for technical violations of supervision.

Line graph showing percent change in daily count of NYC jail population from January 2020 to December 2021. Figure 4. Graph showing the daily count of the NYC jail population by 5 key metrics. By all metrics, the NYC jail population dropped quickly at the start of the pandemic, but then started to rise again. On July 29, 2021 the total NYC jail population was higher than before the pandemic. Critically, the number of people detained pretrial has actually grown — from 4,284 on January 1, 2020 to 4,881 people on December 31, 2021 (with a peak of 5,768 in early July 2021) — likely because of the rollback of significant bail reform efforts last year. The population drops in September 2021 are encouraging but are largely the consequence of Governor Hochul signing the Less is More Act, releasing people on technical violations from jail, and therefore represent a helpful policy change that will reduce the population. However, the steep slope of the decline in September 2021 is unlikely to continue at that rate on its own without additional policy changes. Even with these reforms, the October 1st NYC jail population was only 7% below its pre-pandemic levels.
(Dotted lines connect periods with missing data, so the start of each dotted line and their bends represent specific historical data points.)

Even before COVID-19, prisons and jails were a threat to public health and considered notoriously dangerous places during any sort of viral outbreak. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized years before the pandemic, by taking away a person’s ability to care for their own medical needs, carceral facilities must make sure that those who are incarcerated receive proper medical care–failure to do so can constitute a violation of of the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment and necessitate a reduction in the carceral population. And yet, correctional facilities continue to be the source of a large number of infections in the U.S. The COVID-19 death rate in prisons is almost three times higher than among the general U.S. population, even when adjusted for age and sex (as the prison population is disproportionately young and male). Since the early days of the pandemic, public health professionals, corrections officials, and criminal justice reform advocates have agreed that decarceration is necessary to protect incarcerated people and the community at large from COVID-19. Decarceration efforts must include releasing more people from prisons and jails. Despite this knowledge, state, federal, and local authorities have failed to release people from prisons and jails on a scale sufficient to protect incarcerated people’s lives – and by extension, the lives of everyone in the communities where incarcerated people eventually return, and where correctional staff live and work.

 
 
 

Footnotes

  1. The COVID-19 death rate in prisons at the end of April 2021 stood at a staggering 200 deaths per 100,000 incarcerated people, much higher than the death rate among the general U.S. population of 81 deaths per 100,000 residents. These rates, calculated by the UCLA COVID-19 Behind Bars Data Project, were adjusted to account for differences in age and sex between the prison population and the general U.S. population. For more details about how these rates were calculated, see “COVID-19 Incidence and Mortality in Federal and State Prisons Compared With the US Population, April 5, 2020, to April 3, 2021” published in the Journal of the American Medical Association.  ↩

  2. Among correctional staff exempt from vaccination mandates, adherence to other protective measures is also inadequate. In California, the twice-weekly testing requirement applies to about 10,000 unvaccinated correctional staff, but “nearly a third of [those employees] weren’t complying [with testing] from mid-October through mid-November, according to the most recent data provided by corrections officials.”  ↩

  3. A recent report from the UCLA COVID-19 Behind Bars Data Project reveals that among the 984 prisons publishing COVID-19 data, 72% reported a COVID-19 outbreak in January 2022.  ↩

  4. The American Public Health Association (APHA) stance includes recommendations for “moving toward the abolition of carceral systems and building in their stead just and equitable structures that advance the public’s health by (1) urgently reducing the incarcerated population; (2) divesting from carceral systems and investing in the societal determinants of health (e.g., housing, employment); (3) committing to noncarceral measures for accountability, safety, and well-being; (4) restoring voting rights to formerly and currently incarcerated people; and (5) funding research to evaluate policy determinants of exposure to the carceral system and proposed alternatives.”  ↩

  5. Unfortunately, this major victory for public health was immediately undercut by the federal Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) agency which quickly arrested 88 people who were released under bill S2519. A spokesperson from ICE claimed that these 88 individuals were “violent offenders or have convictions for serious crimes such as homicide, aggravated assault, drug trafficking and child sexual exploitation.” However, these claims are brought into question when considering that the releases that took place under bill S2519 specifically excluded “people serving time for murder or sexual assault” and those serving time for sexual offenses. Although we did not include ICE facilities in our analysis, there is evidence that ICE detention facilities have a COVID-19 case rate that is up to 13 times higher than that of the general U.S. population.  ↩

  6. 118 jails (28% of our sample) have higher populations now than they had before COVID-19. Some of those jails include large county jails with more than 500 people, including Wayne County, Mich., Lubbock and Galveston Counties, Tex., St. Lucie County, Fla., Prince George’s County, Md., and Bergen County, N.J.  ↩

 
 
 

Appendix A: State and federal prison populations during COVID‑19

Prison populations for the federal Bureau of Prisons and all 50 state prison systems from January 2020 through December 2021. When available, we used prison populations as reported by Departments of Correction to The Marshall Project. If that data point was not available, we then used either the monthly average daily population (ADP) or point-in-time population counts. For the federal system, we used the first weekly population each week as reported by the Bureau of Prisons.

Prison system January 2020 February 2020 March 2020 April 2020 May 2020 June 2020 July 2020 August 2020 September 2020 October 2020 November 2020 December 2020 January 2021 February 2021 March 2021 April 2021 May 2021 June 2021 July 2021 August 2021 September 2021 October 2021 November 2021 December 2021 Sources
Alabama 21,154 21,272 21,114 20,655 20,170 19,752 19,342 18,901 18,693 18,262 17,914 17,725 17,454 17,308 17,134 17,051 16,792 17,189 17,724 17,765 17,769 The Marshall Project
& DOC Monthly Reports
Alaska 4,776 4,277 4,216 4,334 4,414 4,511 4,586 4,581 4,559 4,523 4,505 4,493 4,478 4,487 The Marshall Project
Arizona 42,422 42,282 42,360 41,777 41,005 40,529 39,339 39,153 38,894 38,495 38,141 37,731 37,396 36,975 36,704 36,569 36,266 35,954 35,746 35,489 35,410 34,643 34,202 33,855 The Marshall Project
& DOC monthly capacity reports
Arkansas 17,989 18,181 17,860 17,331 16,694 16,552 16,511 16,367 16,215 16,311 16,165 16,094 16,119 16,120 16,085 16,250 16,476 16,560 16,638 16,655 16,698 16,821 DOC monthly director’s board reports
California 117,454 117,432 117,639 113,632 111,072 109,800 102,715 97,342 94,852 94,433 94,179 92,350 91,341 91,516 92,079 92,836 94,103 95,107 95,809 96,194 95,950 96,253 96,556 96,478 The Marshall Project
& CDCR weekly population reports
Colorado 17,751 17,600 17,585 16,382 15,797 15,807 15,531 15,022 14,935 14,673 14,257 13,687 13,558 13,556 13,553 13,537 13,650 13,730 13,968 14,042 14,009 14,149 14,271 14,322 The Marshall Project
& DOC end-of-month population reports
Connecticut 12,381 12,386 12,290 11,454 10,640 10,206 9,645 9,391 9,348 9,233 9,111 9,053 9,100 9,039 9,011 8,947 8,965 9,009 9,143 9,253 9,357 9,426 9,518 The Marshall Project
& DOC monthly reports
Delaware 5,194 5,156 5,042 4,624 4,233 4,195 4,216 4,322 4,457 4,168 4,358 4,677 4,360 4,326 4,269 4,267 The Marshall Project
Federal 164,284 163,635 163,886 163,498 157,340 151,066 145,399 143,071 140,970 140,540 139,446 138,776 137,084 137,361 137,260 137,686 137,633 138,394 138,773 140,295 140,627 140,518 140,803 141,598 BOP weekly population report
Florida 93,764 91,828 88,305 85,839 84,601 82,997 82,027 81,795 79,523 79,322 79,476 79,660 80,298 80,271 The Marshall Project
Georgia 55,218 55,221 55,025 55,019 53,642 51,219 51,213 50,446 49,848 49,365 48,433 48,132 47,703 47,027 46,530 46,309 46,195 46,296 47,364 47,515 47,409 47,736 47,658 47,815 The Marshall Project
& DOC weekly reports
Hawaii 5,208 5,258 4,836 4,260 4,311 4,404 4,508 4,162 4,140 4,184 4,183 4,171 4,200 4,153 4,117 4,084 4,134 4,104 4,113 4,149 4,134 4,114 4,145 4,126 The Marshall Project
& DPS monthly reports
Idaho 7,816 7,641 7,798 7,626 7,426 7,155 7,496 7,407 7,343 7,461 7,827 7,867 7,921 7,878 The Marshall Project
Illinois 36,931 34,668 31,945 31,195 31,236 31,002 30,651 30,001 29,225 29,151 28,160 27,503 27,313 27,313 The Marshall Project
Indiana 27,268 27,298 26,891 26,936 26,418 26,409 25,385 25,691 24,513 24,350 24,203 23,978 23,726 23,745 23,745 23,769 23,554 23,510 23,464 23,435 23,388 23,332 23,229 23,035 The Marshall Project
& DOC monthly reports
Iowa 8,474 8,533 8,401 7,902 7,600 7,493 7,362 7,395 7,415 7,441 7,542 7,489 7,554 7,627 7,673 7,680 7,717 7,741 7,790 7,852 7,951 8,042 8,106 The Marshall Project
& DOC daily statistics
Kansas 9,804 9,673 9,091 8,735 8,580 8,486 8,414 8,408 8,574 8,665 8,719 8,745 8,682 8,650 8,556 8,530 8,445 8,457 8,400 8,345 8,351 The Marshall Project
& DOC end-of-month reports
Kentucky 12,306 12,225 12,162 11,782 11,549 11,272 11,002 10,589 10,391 10,242 10,151 9,854 9,706 9,655 9,625 9,708 9,899 9,930 9,967 10,084 9,990 9,986 9,955 9,835 The Marshall Project
& DOC daily count sheets
Louisiana 15,019 15,067 15,066 14,967 14,775 14,623 14,443 14,313 14,241 14,134 14,052 13,903 13,822 13,722 13,724 13,546 13,522 The Marshall Project
& DOC population trends report
Maine 2,176 2,170 2,138 2,019 1,922 1,922 1,828 1,788 1,783 1,779 1,766 1,718 1,695 1,712 1,679 1,672 1,661 1,603 1,614 1,609 1,597 1,592 1,610 1,599 The Marshall Project
& DOC monthly reports
Maryland 20,314 19,731 19,109 17,635 17,455 18,003 18,280 18,426 The Marshall Project
Massachusetts 7,958 7,950 7,841 7,466 7,260 7,125 7,033 6,973 6,891 6,778 6,729 6,609 6,570 6,524 6,374 6,363 6,318 6,303 6,268 6,180 6,165 6,117 6,098 6,002 The Marshall Project
& DOC weekly counts
Michigan 37,687 35,798 35,798 34,973 34,561 34,134 33,917 33,617 33,370 33,185 32,962 32,822 32,698 The Marshall Project
Minnesota 9,381 8,904 8,718 8,402 8,330 7,736 7,576 7,674 7,549 7,427 7,315 7,327 7,342 7,228 7,251 7,369 7,511 The Marshall Project
& DOC population summary reports
Mississippi 19,147 19,031 18,886 17,794 18,045 17,651 17,448 17,390 17,303 17,274 17,224 17,118 17,137 17,070 17,099 17,225 17,267 17,264 17,380 17,316 17,209 17,187 17,011 16,953 The Marshall Project
& DOC daily population reports
Missouri 25,740 25,133 24,000 23,877 23,777 23,602 23,554 23,397 23,106 23,037 22,783 22,939 23,044 23,057 The Marshall Project
Montana 4,508 4,318 3,962 3,907 3,886 3,812 3,746 3,709 3,620 3,686 3,762 3,782 3,858 3,908 The Marshall Project
Nebraska 5,621 5,539 5,384 5,307 5,272 5,297 5,296 5,308 5,275 5,265 5,302 5,320 5,301 5,363 The Marshall Project
Nevada 12,379 12,403 12,384 12,152 11,937 11,231 11,696 11,696 11,354 11,273 11,222 11,134 11,007 10,926 10,841 10,777 10,640 10,505 10,429 10,260 10,183 10,059 10,015 The Marshall Project
& DOC weekly fact sheets
New Hampshire 2,433 2,359 2,256 2,228 2,209 2,203 2,184 2,155 2,136 2,107 2,071 2,053 2,030 2,016 The Marshall Project
New Jersey 18,439 17,958 16,613 15,866 15,480 15,380 12,800 11,463 11,434 11,128 10,962 10,875 10,722 The Marshall Project
New Mexico 6,573 6,588 6,328 6,175 6,159 6,040 6,012 5,847 5,817 5,772 5,710 5,731 5,708 The Marshall Project
New York 42,784 40,956 38,723 37,559 37,053 36,528 35,983 35,353 34,446 33,376 32,384 31,412 31,456 31,890 The Marshall Project
North Carolina 32,933 33,347 29,886 34,046 30,877 30,873 30,779 30,198 29,922 29,740 29,916 35,140 29,415 29,535 29,487 29,528 The Marshall Project
& DPS population reports
North Dakota 1,254 1,519 1,321 1,247 1,237 1,185 1,191 1,235 1,211 1,293 1,351 1,384 1,368 The Marshall Project
Ohio 48,697 48,695 48,765 48,927 47,620 46,212 45,876 44,972 44,536 44,598 44,441 44,027 43,665 43,495 43,246 43,005 43,014 43,046 42,963 43,080 43,134 43,056 43,193 43,405 The Marshall Project
& DRC weekly population count reports
Oklahoma 25,055 25,039 24,956 24,395 23,891 22,875 22,201 21,980 21,769 21,747 21,678 21,778 21,718 21,665 21,670 21,772 21,725 21,615 21,601 21,597 21,398 21,353 21,347 21,315 The Marshall Project
& DOC weekly counts
Oregon 14,483 14,497 14,459 14,407 14,351 14,055 13,721 13,507 13,484 13,306 13,149 12,989 12,742 12,593 12,404 12,322 12,190 12,098 12,068 12,067 12,045 12,097 12,044 12,020 The Marshall Project
& DOC population trend report
Pennsylvania 47,579 47,382 46,559 45,251 44,556 43,916 43,204 41,964 41,438 41,140 40,786 40,403 40,088 39,499 39,296 39,080 38,868 38,998 38,950 36,979 36,954 36,740 36,541 36,555 The Marshall Project
& DOC monthly population reports
Rhode Island 2,601 2,664 2,674 2,275 2,198 2,180 2,200 2,211 2,184 2,233 2,179 2,076 2,118 2,150 2,120 2,078 2,125 2,118 The Marshall Project
& DOC monthly reports
South Carolina 18,106 18,074 18,028 18,229 17,687 17,455 17,224 16,361 16,121 16,230 15,806 16,013 15,676 15,720 15,586 15,548 15,213 15,420 15,458 15,171 15,275 15,408 15,151 15,182 DOC daily population counts
South Dakota 3,790 3,833 3,701 3,546 3,580 3,367 3,309 3,258 3,235 3,205 3,205 3,159 3,145 3,174 3,180 3,181 3,228 3,339 3,381 3,418 3,462 3,406 The Marshall Project
& DOC monthly reports
Tennessee 21,826 21,793 21,616 21,150 20,394 20,079 19,249 19,279 19,143 19,566 19,605 19,453 19,510 19,433 19,687 19,687 20,537 20,502 20,429 20,485 20,098 20,069 19,998 19,998 The Marshall Project
& DOC monthly reports
Texas 119,541 140,124 135,833 127,200 124,181 121,128 120,709 122,177 121,876 120,873 117,843 117,491 116,926 117,838 The Marshall Project
Utah 6,900 6,441 5,993 5,915 5,824 5,814 5,898 5,496 5,485 5,581 5,602 5,663 5,728 The Marshall Project
Vermont 1,656 1,406 1,395 1,417 1,390 1,417 1,413 1,369 1,380 1,292 1,281 1,272 1,238 1,228 1,395 1,285 1,291 1,300 1,322 1,308 1,319 1,281 The Marshall Project
& DOC daily population reports
Virginia 29,233 29,208 29,161 28,559 27,871 28,595 26,749 26,190 25,659 25,156 24,731 24,235 23,811 23,644 23,796 23,897 23,966 24,229 24,467 24,625 24,694 24,738 24,584 The Marshall Project
& DOC monthly reports
Washington 18,998 19,151 18,797 17,587 16,906 16,703 15,313 15,185 15,093 14,900 14,682 14,518 14,312 14,064 13,875 13,693 13,497 13,380 13,348 12,809 13,200 DOC monthly population reports
West Virginia 5,952 5,556 4,898 4,398 4,331 4,275 4,247 4,189 3,977 3,987 3,962 4,053 4,071 4,425 The Marshall Project
Wisconsin 23,392 23,362 23,591 22,507 22,304 21,576 21,252 21,372 21,136 21,495 20,494 20,401 20,033 19,513 19,539 19,301 19,271 19,380 19,548 19,796 20,070 20,142 20,188 20,088 The Marshall Project
& DOC weekly population counts
Wyoming 2,156 2,098 2,001 1,986 1,959 1,996 2,232 2,157 2,134 2,133 2,252 The Marshall Project

 
 
 

Appendix B: County jail populations during COVID-19

This table shows the jail populations for 415 county jails where data was available where data was available for March 10th, 2020 (the day before the pandemic was declared) and for 75% of the days between March 10th, 2020 and December, 2021. (This table is a subset of the population data available for over 1,000 local jails from the NYU Public Safety Lab Jail Data Initiative.)

*For jails without a population reported on the days we selected, we included the reported population from the closest available date.

State County Jail population on 3/10/2020 Jail population on 5/1/2020 Jail population on 8/22/2020 Jail popualtion on 2/3/2021 Jail population on 7/18/2021 Jail population on 12/31/2021 Percent change in jail population from 3/10/20 to 5/1/20 Percent change in jail population from 5/1/20 to 12/31/21 Percent change in jail population from 3/10/20 to 12/31/21
Ala. Autauga 172 155 156 184 151 115 -10% -26% -33%
Ala. Chilton 212 170 157 204 221 211 -20% 24% 0%
Ala. Clay 39 27 31 37 56 50 -31% 85% 28%
Ala. Cleburne 84 66 64 52 72 47 -21% -29% -44%
Ala. Coffee 127 63 88 111 151 111 -50% 76% -13%
Ala. Coosa 27 17 25 21 31 37 -37% 118% 37%
Ala. Dale 75 65 74 62 85 82 -13% 26% 9%
Ala. DeKalb 169 105 171 167 196 105 -38% 0% -38%
Ala. Houston 394 246 350 393 382 344 -38% 40% -13%
Ala. Jackson 177 122 202 209 191 136 -31% 11% -23%
Ala. Marion 131 89 98 155 166 121 -32% 36% -8%
Ala. Morgan 617 529 575 582 635 502 -14% -5% -19%
Ala. Pike 63 39 50 59 68 64 -38% 64% 2%
Ala. Randolph 64 55 51 69 66 50 -14% -9% -22%
Ala. St. Clair 222 195 185 218 249 201 -12% 3% -9%
Ala. Talladega 301 205 238 318 324 287 -32% 40% -5%
Ala. Washington 58 31 31 37 67 80 -47% 158% 38%
Ariz. Yavapai 537 398 498 479 543 496 -26% 25% -8%
Ariz. Yuma 432 370 389 456 461 422 -14% 14% -2%
Ark. Baxter 121 74 94 124 129 126 -39% 70% 4%
Ark. Crawford 217 121 176 242 232 277 -44% 129% 28%
Ark. Franklin 36 17 58 84 81 91 -53% 435% 153%
Ark. Howard 41 18 21 20 32 39 -56% 117% -5%
Ark. Johnson 64 28 44 83 79 90 -56% 221% 41%
Ark. Marion 42 23 24 61 77 57 -45% 148% 36%
Ark. Nevada 56 39 69 52 49 55 -30% 41% -2%
Ark. Poinsett 81 39 66 79 92 88 -52% 126% 9%
Ark. Pope 193 115 162 159 205 191 -40% 66% -1%
Ark. Saline 235 124 139 185 218 233 -47% 88% -1%
Ark. Stone 36 29 39 36 42 30 -19% 3% -17%
Ark. Union 199 127 135 170 184 156 -36% 23% -22%
Ark. Van Buren 78 33 31 40 80 70 -58% 112% -10%
Ark. Washington 679 343 415 548 630 728 -49% 112% 7%
Ark. White 287 105 110 217 258 269 -63% 156% -6%
Calif. El Dorado 390 306 331 339 313 306 -22% 0% -22%
Calif. Shasta 379 373 473 422 379 384* -2% 3% 1%
Calif. Siskiyou 94 55 82 70 79 72 -41% 31% -23%
Calif. Stanislaus 1,357 1,118 1,118 1,183 1,204 1,283 -18% 15% -5%
Calif. Tulare 1,571 1,095 1,265 1,355 1,444 1,319* -30% 20% -16%
Calif. Yuba 385 257 243 222 198 189 -33% -26% -51%
Colo. Arapahoe 1,134 709 675 820 768 738 -37% 4% -35%
Colo. Bent 55 29 42 77 53 60 -47% 107% 9%
Colo. Boulder 652 385 418 411 474 493 -41% 28% -24%
Colo. Douglas 341 209 212 269 291 342 -39% 64% 0%
Colo. Jefferson 1,265 691 748 795 1,039 1,052 -45% 52% -17%
Colo. Pueblo 646 396 427 416 484 509 -39% 29% -21%
Fla. Alachua 735 592 693 839 762 784 -19% 32% 7%
Fla. DeSoto 147 132 157 154 158 171 -10% 30% 16%
Fla. Flagler 205 165 163 191 193 201 -20% 22% -2%
Fla. Lake 21 17 22 12 27 34 -19% 100% 62%
Fla. Monroe 514 383 395 484 478 517 -25% 35% 1%
Fla. Nassau 243 168 197 236 214 270 -31% 61% 11%
Fla. Sarasota 872 788 820 891 938 964 -10% 22% 11%
Fla. St. Lucie 1,301 1,176 1,278 1,384 1,350 1,332 -10% 13% 2%
Fla. Walton 436 375 404 432 425 438 -14% 17% 0%
Ga. Bartow 673 506 594 610 588 501 -25% -1% -26%
Ga. Berrien 98 61 90 86 83 76 -38% 25% -22%
Ga. Brantley 122 99 135 109 109 97 -19% -2% -20%
Ga. Bulloch 343 251 251 346 367 348 -27% 39% 1%
Ga. Burke 106 87 91 109 103 121 -18% 39% 14%
Ga. Camden 112 103 130 140 136 125 -8% 21% 12%
Ga. Carroll 444 294 343 394 527 447 -34% 52% 1%
Ga. Columbia 276 197 177 218 279 269 -29% 37% -3%
Ga. Decatur 117 103 121 146 123 115 -12% 12% -2%
Ga. Dodge 123 118 121 125 134 140 -4% 19% 14%
Ga. Dougherty 586 378 477 514 542 599 -35% 58% 2%
Ga. Douglas 683 395 472 359 664 631 -42% 60% -8%
Ga. Effingham 237 184 139 158 224 191 -22% 4% -19%
Ga. Elbert 95 54 55 73 68 64 -43% 19% -33%
Ga. Fayette 205 120 141 198 266 230 -41% 92% 12%
Ga. Floyd 645 425 538 566 561 532 -34% 25% -18%
Ga. Gordon 290 192 230 270 227 235 -34% 22% -19%
Ga. Habersham 164 100 120 143 111 119 -39% 19% -27%
Ga. Haralson 185 124 131 136 158 116 -33% -6% -37%
Ga. Jackson 143 93 116 184 166 117 -35% 26% -18%
Ga. Lamar 58 45 41 52 64 50 -22% 11% -14%
Ga. Laurens 337 273 244 318 322 280 -19% 3% -17%
Ga. Liberty 209 156 194 187 202 159 -25% 2% -24%
Ga. Monroe 128 100 105 140 133 118 -22% 18% -8%
Ga. Oconee 28 16 22 18 32 60 -45% 287% 114%
Ga. Pickens 77 50 65 93 96 53 -34% 5% -31%
Ga. Polk 179 117 146 107 205 260 -35% 122% 45%
Ga. Rabun 108 42 66 78 95 74 -61% 76% -31%
Ga. Richmond 1,033 876 914 988 989 928 -15% 6% -10%
Ga. Spalding 388 245 284 343 423 405 -37% 65% 4%
Ga. Sumter 159 106 130 151 172 136 -33% 28% -14%
Ga. Tattnall 86 37 44 82 88 100 -57% 170% 16%
Ga. Tift 229 198 230 268 272 264 -14% 33% 15%
Ga. Turner 67 52 56 50 80 58 -22% 12% -13%
Ga. Union 52 27 37 46 55 44 -48% 63% -15%
Ga. Upson 104 53 74 104 131 147 -49% 177% 41%
Ga. Ware 421 319 361 450 443 387 -24% 21% -8%
Ga. Washington 79 74 81 91 93 102 -6% 38% 29%
Ga. Whitfield 486 333 389 442 435 366* -31% 10% -25%
Ga. Worth 69 54 92 75 122 85 -22% 57% 23%
Idaho Blaine 67 52 45 13 12 12 -22% -77% -82%
Idaho Bonneville 392 283 290 256 296 293 -28% 4% -25%
Idaho Canyon 446 343 410 350 365 391 -23% 14% -12%
Idaho Nez Perce 126 83 103 94 102 88 -34% 6% -30%
Idaho Power 15 9 11 5 9 8 -42% -9% -47%
Idaho Washington 40 28 35 37 35 23 -30% -18% -43%
Ill. Kendall 157 132 129 142 144 130 -16% -2% -17%
Ill. Macon 300 236 307 314 282 310 -21% 31% 3%
Ill. Randolph 25 12 13 22 23 19 -52% 60% -24%
Ill. Will 693 570 568 614 542 617* -18% 8% -11%
Ill. Woodford 52 34 65 72 65 66 -35% 94% 27%
Ind. Dearborn 233 186 283 279 284 235 -20% 26% 1%
Ind. Hamilton 298 171 250 283 287 292 -43% 71% -2%
Ind. Hendricks 266 172 229 206 257 230 -35% 34% -14%
Ind. Jackson 250 156 199 196 235 220 -38% 41% -12%
Ind. Starke 119 98 87 107 133 129 -17% 31% 8%
Iowa Buena Vista 23 6 7 21 18 14 -74% 133% -39%
Iowa Cerro Gordo 69 42 55 53 57 60 -39% 43% -13%
Iowa Clinton 59 26 49 54 56 77 -56% 196% 31%
Iowa Dallas 28 26 43 33 47 43 -7% 65% 54%
Iowa Dickinson 13 5 7 6 7 7 -62% 40% -46%
Iowa Hardin 85 38 75 62 44 34 -55% -11% -60%
Iowa Polk 896 481 691 728 819 701 -46% 46% -22%
Iowa Scott 449 241 272 215 224 219 -46% -9% -51%
Iowa Story 73 30 46 62 48 49 -59% 63% -33%
Kans. Brown 12 12 21 19 21 11 0% -8% -8%
Kans. Crawford 76 51 49 65 87 95 -33% 86% 25%
Kans. Dickinson 20 16 18 4 15 30 -20% 88% 50%
Kans. Doniphan 9 11 4 3 7 5 22% -55% -44%
Kans. Finney 95 56 90 57 99 84 -41% 50% -12%
Kans. Geary 101 64 88 89 93 87 -37% 36% -14%
Kans. Jackson 83 58 57 71 59 70 -30% 21% -16%
Kans. Shawnee 553 368 450 476 535 541 -33% 47% -2%
Kans. Sherman 18 14 18 15 20 9 -22% -36% -50%
Kans. Sumner 143 47 58 94 117 118 -67% 151% -17%
Kans. Thomas 14 11 18 14 12 19 -21% 73% 36%
Kans. Wabaunsee 9 7 5 9 9 8 -21% 12% -11%
Ky. Allen 80 29 54 58 87 81* -64% 181% 1%
Ky. Bell 117 62 111 131 130 136 -47% 121% 16%
Ky. Boone 457 348 450 438 480 375 -24% 8% -18%
Ky. Campbell 591 434 495 524 392 355 -27% -18% -40%
Ky. Christian 768 566 605 633 639 780 -26% 38% 2%
Ky. Clark 305 156 135 175 166 225 -49% 44% -26%
Ky. Daviess 740 485 552 622 586 598 -34% 23% -19%
Ky. Franklin 293 179 198 167 242 238 -39% 33% -19%
Ky. Graves 183 137 147 140 168 195* -25% 42% 7%
Ky. Jackson 128 82 79 80 91 103 -36% 25% -20%
Ky. Jessamine 143 77 83 106 154 117 -47% 53% -18%
Ky. Larue 143 95 85 138 131 152 -33% 59% 6%
Ky. Mason 188 104 113 98 170 163 -45% 57% -13%
Ky. Muhlenberg 278 200 230 234 244 276 -28% 38% -1%
Ky. Nelson 118 73 116 114 84 93 -38% 27% -21%
Ky. Pike 449 347 317 368 392 379 -23% 9% -16%
Ky. Pulaski 352 192 282 266 300 363 -45% 89% 3%
Ky. Rockcastle 104 52 60 53 74 83 -50% 60% -20%
Ky. Todd 135 114 91 127 143 146 -16% 28% 8%
Ky. Wayne 197 127 136 123 136 138 -36% 9% -30%
La. Allen 103 58 62 57 90 96 -44% 66% -7%
La. Assumption 101 84 85 126 135 200 -17% 138% 98%
La. Avoyelles 424 358 340 320 325 373 -16% 4% -12%
La. Beauregard 164 122 130 145 156 225 -26% 84% 37%
La. Bienville 42 29 30 22 21 23 -31% -21% -45%
La. Bogalusa City 19 12 11 13 8 20 -39% 71% 5%
La. Caldwell 611 560 508 572 586 585 -8% 4% -4%
La. Catahoula 72 28 49 51 71 75 -61% 168% 4%
La. Claiborne 579 502 488 430 465 561 -13% 12% -3%
La. East Feliciana 244 220 239 238 237 233 -10% 6% -5%
La. Evangeline 74 54 60 63 67 60 -27% 11% -19%
La. Franklin 815 705 721 818 809 773 -13% 10% -5%
La. Hammond City 14 7 9 10 2 11 -50% 57% -21%
La. Iberville 106 99 124 110 95 89 -7% -10% -16%
La. Jefferson Davis 159 100 79 101 113 102 -37% 2% -36%
La. Lafayette 997 657 500 552 612 636 -34% -3% -36%
La. Lafourche 458 324 320 358 510 586 -29% 81% 28%
La. LaSalle 73 55 66 76 114 111 -25% 102% 52%
La. Morehouse 464 440 491 432 393 383 -5% -13% -17%
La. Pointe Coupee 100 74 73 86 103 81 -26% 10% -19%
La. Rapides 877 743 806 869 904 896 -15% 21% 2%
La. Red River 64 59 49 56 57 46 -8% -22% -28%
La. Richland 751 654 645 696 696 666 -13% 2% -11%
La. Sabine 203 161 167 165 185 230 -21% 43% 13%
La. Shreveport 63 14 30 40 47 42 -78% 200% -33%
La. St. Charles 458 409 415 394 379 385 -11% -6% -16%
La. St. James 68 50 45 57 64 80 -26% 60% 18%
La. St. John 147 132 106 81 72 67 -10% -49% -54%
La. Sulphur 11 7 18 19 8 6 -36% -14% -45%
La. Tangipahoa 573 460 506 563 580 548 -20% 19% -4%
La. Terrebonne 647 514 533 539 573 548 -21% 7% -15%
La. Vermilion 147 124 122 162 142 152 -16% 23% 3%
La. Vernon 131 94 125 119 107 131 -28% 40% 0%
La. Ville Platte 15 19 15 11 9 16 27% -16% 7%
La. Washington 163 116 177 186 187 207 -29% 78% 27%
La. Webster 627 563 538 555 605 618 -10% 10% -1%
La. West Feliciana 25 12 35 123 116 113 -54% 878% 352%
Maine Cumberland 354 240 329 305 304 255 -32% 6% -28%
Mass. Worcester 771 524 498 494 545 572* -32% 9% -26%
Md. Allegany 191 125 153 134 184 169 -35% 35% -12%
Md. Prince Georges 885 699 865 975 1,004 1,016* -21% 45% 15%
Mich. Delta 125 81 103 90 105 122 -35% 51% -2%
Mich. Midland 108 70 78 64 67 87 -36% 25% -19%
Mich. Wayne 2,103 1,746 2,377 3,042 3,051 3,211 -17% 84% 53%
Minn. Beltrami 117 63 78 86 81 82 -46% 30% -30%
Minn. Blue Earth 114 70 89 74 71 59* -39% -16% -48%
Minn. Brown 18 8 17 17 19 20 -56% 150% 11%
Minn. Carlton 33 13 13 24 28 14 -61% 8% -58%
Minn. Chisago 61 22 30 31 35 34 -64% 55% -44%
Minn. Clay 121 65 66 99 110 117 -47% 81% -3%
Minn. Clearwater 17 6 12 7 23 20 -65% 233% 18%
Minn. Crow Wing 157 88 100 87 114 115 -44% 31% -27%
Minn. Fillmore 7 8 5 6 9 6 14% -25% -14%
Minn. Hubbard 64 27 44 49 40 63 -58% 133% -2%
Minn. Isanti 60 22 35 28 29 25 -63% 14% -58%
Minn. Kanabec 40 16 16 17 12 11 -60% -31% -73%
Minn. Kandiyohi 91 60 75 45 52 79 -34% 32% -13%
Minn. Koochiching 4 2 5 10 11 11 -50% 450% 175%
Minn. Le Sueur 24 16 12 13 7 19 -33% 19% -21%
Minn. McLeod 36 10 20 24 30 16 -72% 60% -56%
Minn. Mille Lacs 81 32 38 40 43 47 -60% 47% -42%
Minn. Morrison 33 19 30 25 37 31 -42% 63% -6%
Minn. Nicollet 26 11 14 15 13 12 -58% 9% -54%
Minn. Pipestone 14 2 9 8 12 2 -86% 3% -85%
Minn. Redwood 12 10 14 14 12 13 -17% 30% 8%
Minn. Renville 39 10 20 23 21 36 -74% 260% -8%
Minn. Roseau 21 9 15 7 9 10 -57% 11% -52%
Minn. Scott 141 53 61 103 126 112 -62% 111% -21%
Minn. Sherburne 307 237 255 242 274 300* -23% 27% -2%
Minn. Sibley 10 8 4 6 8 8 -20% 0% -20%
Minn. Swift 4 2 3 3 9 5 -50% 150% 25%
Minn. Wilkin 9 2 6 5 5 15 -78% 650% 67%
Minn. Winona 31 18 28 16 24 18 -42% 0% -42%
Minn. Wright 186 92 108 145 122 132 -51% 43% -29%
Minn. Yellow Medicine 15 10 13 11 17 19 -33% 90% 27%
Miss. Adams 77 69 58 71 90 86 -10% 25% 12%
Miss. Clay 68 59 53 67 83 84 -13% 43% 24%
Miss. Hancock 203 171 211 177 204 193 -16% 13% -5%
Miss. Jackson 340 292 352 368 379 423 -14% 45% 24%
Miss. Jasper 30 20 33 24 27 24 -33% 20% -20%
Miss. Lamar 107 74 92 80 115 86 -31% 16% -20%
Miss. Lee 194 182 205 232 33 33 -6% -82% -83%
Miss. Tunica 27 23 21 27 23 31 -15% 35% 15%
Mo. Barry 46 43 53 65 68 73 -7% 70% 59%
Mo. Bates 31 19 9 14 22 22 -39% 16% -29%
Mo. Benton 35 9 19 25 35 31 -74% 244% -11%
Mo. Boone 253 183 225 240 239 171 -28% -7% -32%
Mo. Buchanan 222 128 177 196 205 145 -42% 13% -35%
Mo. Cape Girardeau 148 149 174 196 222 240 1% 61% 62%
Mo. Christian 102 49 68 74 71 61 -52% 24% -40%
Mo. Clay 301 179 236 207 262 228 -41% 27% -24%
Mo. Jackson 851 643 753 786 777 718 -24% 12% -16%
Mo. Johnson 202 80 108 119 149 165 -60% 106% -18%
Mo. Joplin 54 30 34 36 36 49 -45% 64% -9%
Mo. Lewis 9 10 8 15 14 9 11% -10% 0%
Mo. Marion 81 41 64 82 82 72 -49% 76% -11%
Mo. McDonald 35 19 36 32 45 40 -46% 111% 14%
Mo. Saline 57 41 48 44 63 57 -29% 40% 0%
Mo. Stone 65 38 66 44 50 38 -42% 0% -42%
Mont. Big Horn 38 28 27 33 33 28 -26% 0% -26%
Mont. Lewis and Clark 106 86 103 113 102 102 -19% 19% -4%
Mont. Ravalli 41 26 44 49 50 41 -37% 58% 0%
Mont. Valley 42 20 22 17 19 17 -53% -14% -60%
N.C. Alamance 363 237 218 243 256 323 -35% 36% -11%
N.C. Burke 135 95 124 118 128 88 -30% -7% -35%
N.C. Cabarrus 327 202 188 206 238 254 -38% 26% -22%
N.C. Carteret 167 128 140 103 103 102 -23% -20% -39%
N.C. Catawba 302 183 249 215 299 261 -39% 43% -14%
N.C. Clay 316 228 197 169 261 317 -28% 39% 0%
N.C. Cleveland 325 168 203 232 282 286 -48% 70% -12%
N.C. Davidson 340 219 207 234 287 276 -36% 26% -19%
N.C. Gaston 585 393 505 496 567 501 -33% 27% -14%
N.C. Guilford 1,093 813 764 731 832 860 -26% 6% -21%
N.C. Lee 119 92 124 117 131 134 -23% 46% 13%
N.C. Lincoln 153 80 63 111 129 116 -48% 45% -24%
N.C. Moore 140 113 115 146 153 142 -19% 26% 1%
N.C. Pender 89 72 74 78 81 94 -19% 31% 6%
N.C. Randolph 260 182 263 171 244 227 -30% 25% -13%
N.C. Richmond 114 76 92 76 96 99 -33% 30% -13%
N.C. Rowan 345 216 243 243 333 279 -37% 29% -19%
N.C. Sampson 254 157 164 169 234 262 -38% 67% 3%
N.C. Stanly 157 121 145 139 160 150 -23% 24% -4%
N.C. Transylvania 77 39 43 31 51 45 -49% 15% -42%
N.C. Wake 1,266 1,113 1,074 1,201 1,229 1,289 -12% 16% 2%
N.C. Washington 457 332 303 291 341 323 -27% -3% -29%
N.D. Stutsman 47 42 50 44 47 39 -11% -7% -17%
N.D. Williams 91 88 105 105 83 57 -3% -35% -37%
N.J. Bergen 618 246 301 375 379 663 -60% 170% 7%
N.J. Cumberland 341 221 278 289 339 344 -35% 56% 1%
N.J. Ocean 329 191 292 280 290 319 -42% 67% -3%
N.J. Salem 303 216 292 340 357 352 -29% 63% 16%
N.M. Curry 184 121 174 174 164 149 -34% 23% -19%
N.M. Hobbs 12 7 13 24 8 13* -42% 86% 8%
N.M. Lea 238 121 145 159 180 186 -49% 54% -22%
N.M. San Juan 519 287 410 428 542 515 -45% 79% -1%
N.Y. Monroe 769 634 675 745 744 704 -18% 11% -8%
Nebr. Hall 276 178 227 204 226 251 -36% 41% -9%
Nebr. Lancaster 629 446 535 568 647 661* -29% 48% 5%
Nebr. Lincoln 117 101 115 120 150 115 -14% 14% -2%
Ohio Adams 43 14 34 18 37 32 -67% 129% -26%
Ohio Clermont 379 255 337 333 316 300 -33% 18% -21%
Ohio Clinton 81 52 68 51 71 46 -36% -12% -43%
Ohio Delaware 235 118 161 138 157 154 -50% 31% -34%
Ohio Franklin 2,009 1,350 1,591 1,663 1,683 1,601 -33% 19% -20%
Ohio Gallia 59 33 40 59 63 61 -44% 85% 3%
Ohio Guernsey 105 54 92 77 105 108 -49% 100% 3%
Ohio Hamilton 1,512 925 1,298 1,342 1,276 1,249 -39% 35% -17%
Ohio Morrow 104 79 73 66 110 107 -24% 35% 3%
Ohio Ottawa 92 48 59 51 74 61 -48% 27% -34%
Ohio Pickaway 121 61 106 90 82 99 -50% 62% -18%
Okla. Carter 36 8 40 18 32 6 -78% -25% -83%
Okla. Comanche 357 331 218 289 364 326 -7% -2% -9%
Okla. Garvin 67 35 68 66 81 59 -48% 69% -12%
Okla. Okmulgee 176 161 234 139 130 130 -9% -19% -26%
Okla. Pottawatomie 204 119 201 228 225 158 -42% 33% -23%
Ore. Baker 32 14 12 24 23 16 -56% 14% -50%
Ore. Clackamas 434 138 221 229 244 216 -68% 57% -50%
Ore. Clatsop 58 32 45 50 61 55 -45% 72% -5%
Ore. Douglas 206 72 78 147 175 133 -65% 85% -35%
Ore. Harney 8 2 4 7 8 7 -71% 204% -13%
Ore. Jackson 327 243 264 257 282 266* -26% 9% -19%
Ore. Josephine 192 94 167 97 181 147 -51% 56% -23%
Ore. Klamath 136 75 79 84 111 115 -45% 53% -15%
Ore. Lincoln 161 70 97 108 110 117 -57% 67% -27%
Ore. Linn 207 105 129 122 154 116 -49% 10% -44%
Ore. Marion 430 275 289 318 297 348 -36% 27% -19%
Ore. Marion Work Center 91 31 70 55 59* 59* -66% 90% -35%
Ore. Multnomah 1,122 718 625 812 802 796 -36% 11% -29%
Ore. Polk 110 24 72 67 98 80 -78% 233% -27%
Ore. Tillamook 65 38 37 26 36 17 -42% -55% -74%
Ore. Wasco 132 51 49 65 78 69 -61% 35% -48%
Ore. Washington 878 477 527 456 583 580 -46% 22% -34%
Ore. Yamhill 167 53 60 77 75 85 -68% 60% -49%
Pa. Clinton 46 46 191 175 185 138 0% 200% 200%
Pa. Cumberland 409 265 252 242 299 311 -35% 17% -24%
Pa. Dauphin 1,110 890 871 975 970 1,003 -20% 13% -10%
Pa. Lancaster 786 625 670 619 710 740 -20% 18% -6%
S.C. Aiken 460 380 418 430 302 289 -17% -24% -37%
S.C. Anderson City 97 83 88 93 94 80 -14% -4% -18%
S.C. Berkeley 439 327 326 396 414 434 -26% 33% -1%
S.C. Cherokee 358 265 297 316 344 330 -26% 25% -8%
S.C. Darlington 164 160 142 181 204 165 -2% 3% 1%
S.C. Kershaw 80 73 111 92 110 116 -9% 59% 45%
S.C. Laurens 226 165 177 175 229 185 -27% 12% -18%
S.C. Lexington 493 314 339 424 504 457 -36% 46% -7%
S.C. Marion 7 7 1 1 2 1 0% -86% -86%
S.C. Pickens 303 203 253 209 252 305 -33% 50% 1%
S.C. Sumter 310 266 259 295 334 325 -14% 22% 5%
S.D. Clay 12 7 13 19 15 18 -42% 157% 50%
Tenn. Blount 533 371 517 444 463 465 -30% 25% -13%
Tenn. Macon 300 236 307 314 283 308 -21% 31% 3%
Tenn. Polk 181 147 147 149 144 125 -19% -15% -31%
Tenn. Shelby 1,857 1,576 1,339 1,228 1,021 1,355 -15% -14% -27%
Tenn. Wayne 152 124 121 128 138 134 -18% 8% -12%
Tex. Archer 26 20 31 20 25 34 -23% 70% 31%
Tex. Bell 869 623 815 1,028 1,222 1,281 -28% 106% 47%
Tex. Brown 166 135 173 165 162 194* -19% 44% 17%
Tex. Calhoun 78 64 73 83 77 69 -18% 8% -12%
Tex. Coleman 33 32 40 35 37 38 -3% 19% 15%
Tex. Cooke 163 148 155 145 148 150 -9% 1% -8%
Tex. DeWitt 81 79 87 90 96 90 -2% 14% 11%
Tex. Ellis 375 295 328 394 464 435 -21% 47% 16%
Tex. Erath 80 45 73 55 95 79 -44% 76% -1%
Tex. Galveston 997 697 862 987 1,020 1,028 -30% 47% 3%
Tex. Hopkins 159 129 191 162 177 181 -19% 40% 14%
Tex. Jim Wells 62 60 44 46 54 69 -3% 15% 11%
Tex. Lavaca 27 17 15 11 23 26 -37% 53% -4%
Tex. Lubbock 1,255 1,154 1,295 1,227 1,340 1,315* -8% 14% 5%
Tex. Parmer 28 19 21 24 22 25 -32% 32% -11%
Tex. Polk 188 143 193 193 207 224 -24% 57% 19%
Tex. Randall 416 356 411 393 411 357 -14% 0% -14%
Tex. Rockwall 226 184 236 188 208 189 -19% 3% -16%
Tex. Terry 84 77 93 97 91 88 -8% 14% 5%
Tex. Titus 133 82 101 79 93 88 -38% 7% -34%
Tex. Tom Green 393 341 454 462 516 491 -13% 44% 25%
Tex. Wharton 145 83 117 102 123 122 -43% 47% -16%
Utah Salt Lake 2,144 1,356 1,215 1,489 1,725 1,724 -37% 27% -20%
Va. Blue Ridge Bedford 100 81 98 88 93 82 -19% 2% -18%
Va. Blue Ridge Halifax 180 184 164 183 40 149 2% -19% -17%
Va. Blue Ridge Lynchburg 470 397 415 491 516 299 -15% -25% -36%
Va. Chesapeake 1,031 965 912 1,001 1,026 904 -6% -6% -12%
Va. Danville 364 298 328 300 274 268 -18% -10% -26%
Va. Middle Peninsula 178 144 161 168 159 147 -19% 2% -17%
Va. Middle River 901 747 836 840 786 789 -17% 6% -12%
Va. Norfolk 935 727 717 963 912 801 -22% 10% -14%
Va. Pamunkey 391 265 406 444 400 362 -32% 37% -7%
Va. Riverside 1,376 1,154* 1,203* 1,262* 1,231* 1,069 -16% -7% -22%
Va. Roanoke 172 149 195 164 178 125 -13% -16% -27%
Va. Virginia Beach 1,509 1,207* 1,172* 1,299 1,269 1,120 -20% -7% -26%
Va. Virginia Peninsula 377 336 339 358 367 354 -11% 5% -6%
Va. Western Virginia 944 765 808 811 848 789 -19% 3% -16%
Wash. Chelan 197 141 160 135 125 101 -28% -28% -49%
Wash. Clallam Forks 17 11 11 12 17 9 -35% -18% -47%
Wash. Clark 663 364 429 432 353 350 -45% -4% -47%
Wash. Grays Harbor 180 109 139 136 118 132 -39% 21% -27%
Wash. Grays Harbor Aberdeen 22 9 9 10 11 10 -59% 11% -55%
Wash. Grays Harbor Hoquiam 31 15 29 23 17 18 -52% 20% -42%
Wash. Island 68 37 41 51 42 44 -46% 19% -35%
Wash. Jefferson 30 21 29 15 25 23 -30% 10% -23%
Wash. King Issaquah 57 19 30 39 28 38 -67% 100% -33%
Wash. Kitsap 385 167 237 274 258 285 -57% 71% -26%
Wash. Klickitat 40 19 40 40 40 38 -53% 100% -5%
Wash. Lewis 192 106 167 189 151 139 -45% 31% -28%
Wash. Okanogan 161 71 79 106 92 83 -56% 17% -48%
Wash. Skagit 280 131 137 176 170 174 -53% 33% -38%
Wash. Skamania 25 9 23 20 16 12 -64% 33% -52%
Wash. Snohomish 747 336 443 403 464 399 -55% 19% -47%
Wash. Snohomish Lynnwood 49 9 18 15 14 10 -82% 11% -80%
Wash. Snohomish Marysville 35 4 7 14 24 10 -89% 150% -71%
Wash. Thurston Olympia 23 13 13 7 12 18 -43% 38% -22%
Wash. Walla Walla 89 66 72 80 52 46 -26% -30% -48%
Wash. Whatcom 291 150 211 207 222 240 -48% 60% -18%
Wash. Whitman 31 19 24 26 23 27 -38% 41% -13%
Wash. Yakima 879 489 444 585 615 578 -44% 18% -34%
Wis. Brown 719 634 587 652 660 663 -12% 5% -8%
Wis. Eau Claire 275 168 168 186 213 173 -39% 3% -37%
Wis. La Crosse 152 64 81 98 115 85 -58% 33% -44%
Wis. Lincoln 105 61 74 80 66 53 -42% -13% -50%
Wis. Manitowoc 209 180 161 131 211 166 -14% -8% -21%
Wis. Sawyer 114 80 84 88 108 100 -29% 24% -12%
Wyo. Big Horn 70 68 60 59 60 53 -3% -22% -24%
Wyo. Lincoln 44 37 35 21 21 26 -16% -30% -41%
Wyo. Park 42 31 26 33 42 44 -26% 42% 5%



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